Patrick LiuSenior Research Assistant, The Hamilton Project
The United States spends large and growing sums on criminal justice. In 1982, real per capita spending on law enforcement was $205; when added to spending of $98 and $84 on corrections and the judicial system, respectively, the United States spent roughly $388 per capita on criminal justice in that year. Since then, all three of those expenditures have grown dramatically, with corrections expenditures growing especially quickly through the end of the 20th century, as shown in figure 1. Corrections spending has grown only 6 percent since 2000, when the incarceration rate leveled off and eventually began to decline, but total criminal justice spending rose 16 percent to its 2015 level of $937 per capita.
Corrections spending—which includes not only incarceration but also parole, probation, and rehabilitation—cost the country fully $92 billion in 2015. Incarceration is particularly expensive, constituting 85.7 percent of corrections spending at the state level (BJS 1982–2015).
These growing expenditures have put pressure on state and local budgets. Unsurprisingly, they coincide with an increasing tendency to use monetary sanctions to fund the criminal justice system (Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller 2010).
 The recent Supreme Court ruling in Timbs v. Indiana (2019) limits “excessive” forfeitures by states, but this is not likely to end the practice of civil asset forfeiture.
 Some subcounty governments do not report revenues and expenditures in the Census of Governments (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). We sum all non-missing values within a county. Consequently, we do not weight the calculations by county population, which would be inappropriate for counties with missing data. However, when we weight by jurisdiction population (e.g., cities and towns, and excluding county governments), we find a similar pattern.
 In New York State, for example, individuals convicted of an offense must pay $300 for felony convictions, $175 for misdemeanors, and $95 for violations as a mandatory surcharge (New York City Bar 2018).
 As court-imposed monetary sanctions do not include fees that correctional institutions can levy on prisoners, these estimates are likely to underestimate the prevalence of criminal justice debt. See Eisen (2014) for more information.
 The data exclude monetary sanctions for traffic cases. One important caveat is that a single individual can be assessed monetary sanctions for multiple cases. Whereas we report the total monetary sanctions levied on individuals (i.e., the total debt accrued due to their criminal history), the median monetary sanction for a single felony conviction in Alabama was about $2,000 (Greenberg, Meredith, and Morse 2016). Similar research in Washington State found that the median monetary sanction was $1,347 per felony conviction (Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010).
 The bars do not add up to 100 percent because we focus only on technical violations, which are not the only reasons that courts may revoke parole or probation. Moreover, respondents can give multiple responses.
 Importantly, criminal justice debt could also be a factor in some of the other technical violations, such as unemployment or criminal association, to the extent that it impairs employment prospects (Appleman 2016).
 Because we are limiting the calculation to prison inmates (who are incarcerated for longer spells than jail inmates), this is a conservative estimate of the contribution of monetary sanctions to incarceration. Many more people can end up in jail for failures to pay off court debt, in part due to arrest for repeated missed payments (Shapiro 2014b).
 In 2012, over 20 percent of all jail bookings in Huron County, Ohio were related to a failure to pay fines (American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio 2013). In 2013, 29 percent of jail bookings in Tulsa County, Oklahoma were connected to warrants for failure to pay costs—up from 8 percent in 2004 (Smith and Aspinwall 2013). From 2005–07, incarcerations for court debt comprised 18 percent of all commitments in the state of Rhode Island (Rhode Island Family Life Center 2008). And in Benton County, Washington, about a quarter of people in jail for misdemeanor offenses were there due to a failure to pay court fines and fees (Shapiro 2014a).
 By contrast, criminal asset forfeiture necessitates a criminal conviction before courts can seize assets.
 A February 2019 Supreme Court decision in Timbs v. Indiana (2019) is expected to limit “excessive” forfeitures by states.
 The DEA was responsible for about 80 percent of federal cash seizures by the Department of Justice from FY2007 to FY2016.
 See also Holcomb et al. (2018).
 It is important to note that this 10 percent fee is not part of the typical fees counted in prior facts because the revenue does not typically go to the state, but rather to private firms.