THE HAMILTON PROJECT AT BROOKINGS
THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF CRIME AND MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, May 1, 2014
ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180  Fax (703) 519-7190
PARTICIPANTS:

Welcome and Introductions:

ROBERT E. RUBIN
Co-Chair, Council on Foreign Relations; Former
U.S. Treasury Secretary

ROUNDTABLE: A NEW APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WHILE
MAINTAINING LOW RATES OF CRIME

Authors:

STEVEN RAPHAEL
Professor of Public Policy, Goldman School of
Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

MICHAEL STOLL
Professor and Chair of Public Policy, School
of Public Affairs; Associate Director, Center for
the Study of Urban Poverty, University of
California, Los Angeles

Discussants:

DEAN ESSERMAN
Police Chief, New Haven, Connecticut

CRISTINE DEBERRY
Chief of Staff for the District Attorney, City
and County of San Francisco

DANIEL NAGIN
Teresa and H. John Heinz III University Professor
of Public Policy and Statistics, Carnegie Mellon
University
PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):

**Moderator:**

MELISSA S. KEARNEY
Director, The Hamilton Project

**Roundtable: A New Approach to Preventing Youth Violence and Dropout**

**Author:**

JENS LUDWIG
McCormick Foundation Professor of Social Service Administration, Law, and Public Policy, The University of Chicago

**Discussants:**

ELIZABETH GLAZER
Director, Office of Criminal Justice for New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio

ROBERT LISTENBEE
Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice

LAURENCE STEINBERG
Distinguished University Professor and Laura H. Carnell Professor of Psychology, Temple
PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D):

Moderator:

JIM TANKERSLEY
Economic Policy Correspondent
The Washington Post

* * * * *
PROCEEDINGS

MR. RUBIN: I'm Bob Rubin. On behalf of my colleagues, The Hamilton Project, welcome you to today's discussion -- "The Economic and Social Effects of Crime and Mass Incarceration in the United States". Let me say a word or two about The Hamilton Project before we get into the program itself. About eight, nine years ago I think it was, a group of us who cared deeply about public policy got together to create an organization to support policy development and to attempt to contribute to the seriousness of the discussion about economic policy. Hamilton Project is not an institution. It is a small partnership of policy experts, of academics, of practitioners, business leaders, organized as an advisory council. We support market based economics but we believe equally in the role of government and a strong role for government in meeting the many purposes for economics success that markets by their very nature will not meet. We believe the objectives of economic policy should be growth, broad based sharing and
participation in the benefits of growth and economic security. The advisory council, with the wide range of experience and involvement that I mentioned a moment ago, does I think, provide a distinct perspective to The Hamilton Project and the policy work that it does. Our policy papers are commissioned from leading experts around the country and are then subject to rigorous peer review. Our program today focuses on mass incarceration and on interventions to reduce the engagement of younger people in counterproductive activity. May I make one personal comment? The first thing I did after I left treasury was to become chairman of the board of something called LISC -- Local Industry Support Corporation. It's the largest community development organization in the country. It distributes about a billion dollars a year to inner cities. And it wasn't long after I got involved in that, that I had begun to get struck by how much of a role mass incarceration and our prison and our sentencing regime was having on poverty, recidivism, and on conditions in inner cities and it
is that experience that, while I'm certainly no expert in any of these areas, got me to care so deeply about these issues. I believe that our currently policy regime, with respect to incarceration and the paucity of interventions to try to prevent people from getting involved in counterproductive behavior is socially and economically counterproductive, socially and economically destructive, and with respect to incarceration, deeply unjust in many cases. These matters are almost always discussed in social and moral terms, but they are critical economic issues.

Our purpose today is to try to focus on a better understanding of these economic dimensions. We believe that a better understanding of these economic dimensions will lead to better policy making, and to better policy making decisions. While there are a number of institutions that work actively on these issues from a criminal justice perspective, we felt that bringing The Hamilton Project forum, The Hamilton Project platform, to bear on these issues, could help to contribute to or help promote a broader
understanding of the tremendous social costs that are involved in our currently policy regime, and the terrible losses of productivity so that this really is a very important economic issue to all of us, no matter where we may live or what our incomes may be. And that in turn, if more broadly understood, could help create support for change. There's a document in your materials called ten economic facts about crime and incarceration in the United States. I strongly recommend you read it. The facts tell both individually, and then there's a cumulative narrative -- a powerful and I think deeply troubling story about the unnecessary and serious harm that derives from our present policy, regime and the imperative for reform. Let me just mention a few of these facts. The incarceration rate in the United States is six times the typical country in the OECD, and the OECD as you know is the organization of largest economies in the world. U.S. has five percent of the global population and 25 percent of the global prison populations. We do have a relatively high rate
of violent crime. But the differences in our incarceration rates are very heavily influenced by more severe penalties that we impose for crimes, and then the many situations which wouldn't be treated as criminal acts or at least wouldn't result in imprisonment, in other systems and do here.

An African American male without a high school degree has a 70 percent chance of going to prison. An African American child of a high school dropout father, or for an African American child of a high school dropout father is over 50 percent chance that the father will spend some time in prison by the time that child is 14. These kinds of incarceration conditions undermine employment prospects, undermine education skills development, work habits, the increased behavioral problems amongst children of parents in prison, they disrupt families and more broadly, they are deeply destructive to the society we live in.

Moreover, and about the major subject we discussed four or five years ago in a Hamilton Project.
event of this kind, but that we won't be touching on today, there are about 700,000 individuals released every year from prison. And we not only provide for the most part, minimal assistance in helping these people reintegrate into society, but in many cases, we create serious impediments to successful reintegration. I was just discussing with one of the people here, the business that she's involved in, in which there's immensely strong bias against hiring people with a prison record. An article the other day about a company that just settled a law suit with the -- I believe it was the justice department, but anyway, somebody or other, and this company had a rule against hiring people who had been in prison. Analysis of the economic dimensions of incarceration, of intervention, in my judgment, should be done in the context of a cost benefit analysis, and the costs include not just the cost of imprisonment, but, and I suspect these numbers may be very much larger than the simple cost of imprisonment -- but the multiple collateral costs that are almost surely exceedingly
large, including some that have already referred to the effects on job prospects, the effects on future lives. Younger people get caught up in the criminal justice system and the disruption of families and so much else.

Unfortunately, there's been very little quantitative work done on this cost benefit question and maybe it doesn't lend itself to quantitative work, but it does seem to me that it would greatly benefit from quantitative work and hopefully more will be done. There is some and there is some reference to that in the data in our material. But even without the quantitative work, if you have any exposure and most of you here probably do have exposure to the kinds of issues we're talking about, I think it's clear that the effects -- the adverse effects of all of this are enormous.

Despite all of the difficulties that exist politically, in trying to deal with these issues, and to some extent, the reason for this session today, was the thought that I bring The Hamilton Project's

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180  Fax (703) 519-7190
economic forum to bear on this question, we might be able to make some contribution to increasing awareness to the economic issues and thereby, as I said earlier, a few moments ago, increase support for change. Despite these very significant difficulties there is change taking place. There are states, there are cities, there are counties, that have made real changes and there are some changes that have taken place at the federal level and others that are being pursued.

That takes us to today's program. We have a terrific, terrific group of panelists as you are about to find out. And I look forward to what I think will be highly interesting but also in some ways much more importantly informative and thoughtful and insightful discussions. In accordance with the practice of The Hamilton Project, I will introduce the members of the panels, but I won't recite from their resumes. They're in your material. The two senators who are to be with us, and I think are to be much commended for taking on this politically difficult subject, and also
for working across party lines in Congress, where that is not particularly common at the present moment, are not going to be with us today, unfortunately. They have -- a vote has been called in to Senate, and so they will be voting, which is what senators are supposed to do. And we will very much miss them. And as I say, I think they really should be commended. This is a politically very difficult issue and it is also very difficult in today's environment, to work as they are doing, across party lines.

Our first panel is "A New Approach to Reducing Incarceration While Maintaining Low Rates of Crime". The panel starts with a paper written by Steven Raphael, Professor of Public Policy, University of California Berkeley, and Michael Stoll, Professor and Chair of Public Policy, School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles. The discussants are Dean Esserman, the Chief of Police of New Haven, who has been, I believe, police chief in four cities at this point over the last something like 20 years, Cristine DeBerry, Chief of Staff for the
District Attorney, City of San Francisco, and Daniel Nagin, University Professor of Public Policy and Statistics, Carnegie-Mellon University. The moderator is Melissa Kearney, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland, and Director of The Hamilton Project.

Our second panel is titled, "A New Approach to Preventing Youth Violence and Dropout". That will start with a paper by Jens Ludwig, Professor of Social Service Administration, Law and Public Policy, of the University of Chicago. The discussants are Elizabeth Glazer, Director, Office of Criminal Justice for Mayor Bill de Blasio, New York City, Robert Listenbee, Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice, Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, and Laurence Steinberg, Distinguished Professor at Temple University, Temple University. The moderator will be Jim Tankersley, the Economic Policy Correspondent for the Washington Post.

Let me close by thanking three individuals who developed the intellectual construct for today's program and who brought all of this together, Melissa
Kearney, I've already mentioned, our Director, Karen Anderson, the Managing Director of The Hamilton Project and Ben Harris, the Policy Director of The Hamilton Project. Let me also say as always that we have an enormously talented staff at The Hamilton Project and without them, none of the work that we get done would happen. Thank you all very much. Melissa, the podium is yours.

MS. KEARNEY: Thanks everyone for being here. Thanks to Secretary Rubin for the opening remarks. So the first panel of the day will focus on the topic of incarceration and sentencing forms. As Secretary Rubin put this in the context of mass incarceration, which we have in the United States, and we define that to be based on the fact that the rate of incarceration in the U.S. is way off the charts as compared to comparable countries, and there seems to be a consensus at this moment in time among scholars and policy makers, that perhaps we're not fighting crime as effectively as we could be, with such a heavy reliance on incarceration. So the focus of the panel...
will be around a new proposal, by Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll and to kick that off, Steven will give us a brief overview of the main elements of their policy proposal.

MR. RAPHAEL: Okay, thank you. Good afternoon everybody. So since the 1970s, the rate at which we incarcerate inmates in state and federal prison has increased almost five fold. We now have a very high incarceration rate relative to our past cells and we have the highest incarceration rate in the world. Aside from having lots of people in prison, it's also the case that there are certain communities in the country that have very, very high incarceration rates, in particular, African American communities and then within demographic groups, African American males with relatively less education. And of course, associated with this large increase in incarceration are all of the collateral consequences associated with that. A large wake of people who are former prisoners, lots of families who have family members who have done time, and so on and so forth.
It's interesting that in some communities the ubiquity of incarceration is such that Sesame Street actually has a character on an online set of tools that is meant to help children cope with incarcerated family members. So for example the Muppet online is supposed to be a child whose father is incarcerated and he's having a hard time in his absence and a hard time talking about it with friends. So it's sort of seeped into the mainstream in ways that perhaps was unthinkable in decades past. So why is it that we have so many Americans in prison? What happened? Why did we see this big increase over the last 30 years?

Well it turns out that the answer to that question is relatively simple. Relative to the past, we are much more likely today to punish people today with prison, than we were many years ago, especially for drug offenders, and it's that increase in extensivity contributes quite a bit to the growth in our incarcerated population. And aside from that extensiveness with which we use prison, when we send people to prison, we're more likely to keep them there.
for a long time, and that's especially true for violent offenders. So my colleague Michael Stoll and I have spent a lot of time trying to understand to what extent do various behavioral explanations of growth incarceration such as the crack epidemic, or the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill or the weaker economy are explaining prison growth, and basically, our conclusion is that it's basically our policy choices, that we're choosing to sentence people to prison, and our sentences have become discreetly much more harsh, and that's what explains what's happened.

Now one might ask, what is it that we get from this, in terms of benefits? It certainly is the case that when you incarcerate criminally active people, that you prevent crime, and it can happen through several avenues -- through incapacitating people that are criminally active and perhaps from deterring people who might commit crime in the absence of the threat of punishment. It turns out, however, that empirical research on this question strongly
suggests that the marginal returns to additional increases in incarceration decline, and they decline quite rapidly as scale increases. And that's due to a couple of different things. First of all, when we increase the liberalness with which we apply prison, in other words, we're applying it more extensively, we tend to net people who aren't as criminally active when they're not institutionalized, and it brings the active effectiveness of prison down and the marginal effectiveness even lower.

Aside from that, when we send people out of prison for a long time, we incarcerate people into age ranges where they're not really as criminally active as they once were. So it's when a standard empirical result in criminology that offending declines quite rapidly with age, even within -- you can look within prisons, and you'll see that if you look at institutional misconduct among inmates, that it declines quite rapidly with age, for all offenses -- serious and less serious. You take these two things together and basically what it means is we have kind
of a classic case of diminishing marginal returns. I'm an economist, so I have to say something like that at this point. And it turns out that at least at the current levels in the United States, and perhaps we can talk about this more later, that the marginal benefits in crime reduction are quite low, and there's room for reducing incarceration without having appreciable impacts on crime, especially if the resources are reinvested in other ways.

So we have a proposal that's two parts -- to encourage states and perhaps federal policy to scale back the use of incarceration in a way that we hope we'll use prison beds more smartly and reserve them for people where it will actually have a crime preventing effect. And the first thing we argue for is that there be more discretion afforded to certain actors in the criminal justice system in terms of deciding who to send to prison and how long they should be there. And we suggest two changes. One -- we believe that states that have truth in sentencing provisions in their penal codes, which are basically
provisions that require that certain offenders serve at least 85 percent of their sentences -- that that be revisited and perhaps either scaled back or abandoned. So there's quite excellent research that suggests that when parole is not a possibility, people don't engage in rehabilitative offending, or in rehabilitative programming, they're more likely to recidivate when they're released, and also that there are people who are probably safe bets that aren't released when they can be. So we think that that could be revised.

Second, we believe that states should take inventory of, and re-evaluate legislative mandatory minimum sentences, which are basically written sentences that apply to specific offenses and it applies to everyone regardless of criminal history, and regardless of how they behave once they're incarcerated. In most instances, mandatory minimum sentences are written for offenses for which prison is already a possibility. And we believe that it unnecessarily ties the hands of judges, and then on the release decision of parole boards in a way that
creates inefficiency in the use of prison beds and exacerbates our over-incarceration.

The second part of our proposal has more to do with the relationship between county and state governments. So in California, we've undergone a very big change, where now the counties are much more responsible for criminal justice policy pertaining to felony offenders. And one of the things that was uncovered, is there's enormous heterogeneity across counties in the degree to which they use prisons, with some counties' incarcerating people at five times the rates of other counties. And it can't be explained by differences in demographics, can't be explained by differences in crime. It's just that some counties incarcerate a lot of people. And when you really think about the way things work in the criminal justice system, the counties prosecute and send people to prison, and then the state pays for it. So essentially, the marginal cost in many instances, to counties is zero, of sending someone to prison, while keeping the person in the county actually cost
something. So we think that that cost structure is wrong. And we propose several different strategies perhaps, for creating a positive marginal cost for counties, some of which would hold county budgets constant and some which would actually charge them amount. But they're just different possibilities in the examples across the state. So for example, one could imagine a per head tax to the county that increased as the severity of the offender decreased, or alternatively, one could imaging providing block grants to the county, of money for criminal justice expenditures, which is then reduced head for head for people that are sent to prison. Can I have one more minute? Is that okay? The other is, one could imagine a predetermined kind of ban in which your county incarceration rate can fall. If you go above that ban, the county could be taxed. If you come in below, the cost savings could be shared with the county. And these are just a couple of different ideas. Now there is actually evidence of counties being responsive to
these cost incentives, so for example, in 1995, California passed legislation that basically increased the per head tax for juveniles admitted to the California Youth Authority from some nominal amount to a quite substantial amount for less serious offenders. In fact, for the least serious offenders, counties had to pick up almost 100 percent of the bill. And as this graph is showing, what you see is admissions to the CYA plummet once the counties had to pay for part of it. So that makes a difference. Or just one further example -- lots of states have experimented with cost sharing with adult probation, whereby if adult probation departments can reduce their revocation rate below some historical baseline, the savings associated with that in terms of fewer prison admissions is then shared with the county for criminal justice and rehabilitative expenditures. So there's lots of room for creativity here. So we believe there's room to reduce incarceration with impact on crime and we just offer a few ideas, and hopefully we'll have more time to discuss in greater detail.
Okay. All right.

MS. KEARNEY: Okay, thank you. So we are thrilled to have a line of discussants, with a range of experiences and perspectives. So to kick us off, I'm going to ask Cristine, who is Chief of Staff at the District Attorney in the City and County of San Francisco to give us your reactions to this proposal, as someone who's worked very closely with this issue in a very practical way. We all know about the overcrowding of prisons in California, and you had to deal with this issue as Steven talked about, so what exactly is your experience in California, in terms of how you went about doing this and what are the results that you see on the ground?

MS. DEBERRY: Yes, I think the paper is critical, if we're going to talk about moving away from incarceration as our default setting in criminal justice. In our county, in San Francisco, about 45 percent of our cases qualify under the realignment proposal. So nearly half of our case load at any given time, is people that are there on a non-violent
non-serious, non-sex offense case. You can then deduce from that what types of cases those are. When District Attorney Gascone came into office, about 60, a little over 60 percent of our case load was dedicated to drug prosecution. Over the years that he's been there, we've reduce that by about 30 percent, and have decided that we want to focus our resources on the more serious and violent cases -- the things all of us to be doing as prosecutors -- protecting you in your homes and in your bedrooms, from a predator. But not so much prosecuting somebody that has a substance abuse issue. And what we've seen in that experiment -- San Francisco already sends a very small amount of people to state prison, but we've reduce that even further, as a result of these types of policies and we're now asking ourselves the tough questions around who we're sending to county jail. So it does start to align the incentives in the right place. We send about 10 percent of all of our convicted felons to state prison. That's exceptionally low I think. The professors would tell
you and something that we're proud of in our office—
that we don't use it at our first go to place on our
cases, rather as a backup. And when realignment
passed, there was a question asked of all of us, and
district attorneys around the states said what kind of
resources are coming with it? What are you going to
ask for? How are you going to staff this new work?
And what we decided to do with the resources that came
into our county, is we hired a social worker. We
didn't hire any more attorneys. We decided we wanted
somebody to help us figure out how to do the work
slightly better. Having been an attorney myself from
the courtroom, you're very good at persuading a jury
and objecting to evidence, and getting your point
across and winning an argument. What you're quite
terrible at is deciding what treatment program
somebody might need, or what type of mental health
issues they might have. That was something I spent no
time on in school, and then was asked to be an expert
on, on a daily basis, repeatedly, as people were
coming across the threshold of the courtroom. And so
what we did is we hired a social workers. We called him an alternative sentencing planner. We told him, work on realignment cases. Let the DAs come to you. Don't force yourself on them. We didn't want organ rejection from our staff. And what we quickly learned was while the realignment cases were of interest; many more cases were of interest to our prosecutors. They wanted this type of a resource, because there were so many difficult decisions they are making every single day that are outside of their academic wheelhouse, that this became a critical resource. So we've had the person on staff now about two years, and the year and a half that I have data for you, he looked at about 300 cases. Of those, 89 have concluded and have been sentenced. On those 89 cases, when the cases originally came through, they were exposed to about 306 years in prison, as a cumulative group. Our offers to them -- the first time we decided what we thought the case was worth -- were 96 years in prison. That would have been a cost of $5 million to the state. But our alternative sentencing planner social
worker got involved in those cases, and on the cases, we ended up with a total of 11 years of state prison rather than the 96 -- that cost about $570,000. So in just that very small experiment, you can see that we saved the state $4.5 million. We've now decided that this is a worthwhile effort and something we're going to continue to try to expand in our office. We have many more cases where this should be a service available to the attorneys. We just don't have the resources at the moment to do that, but you can imagine if you scale something like this and you go to a county like Los Angeles where I used to practice, the enormity of the cases there. You would see dramatic savings to the state. And I think the question we're having now is how do we translate those savings to the county level, and how do we start to have the cost shifting conversation around doing our work the right way. So rewarding prosecutors for the success of the individual once they leave our system, rather than how much we were able to extract from them when they came in.
MS. KEARNEY: I'm going to follow up with you for a minute because I think the obvious worry, when we hear -- okay, let's put fewer people behind bars, and you've managed to successfully do that in your county, in a way that you say, okay, there's a set of people, or a set of crimes, that we were sending to prison, and there's a better way to treat those people, right? But the worry is, well, if those alternative ways don't work, to the same way as just having them off the streets do, there's going to be an increase in crime, right? So we can't just open the doors and have an increase in crime even if it does save -- save the county, save the state money. So having nothing to do with this panel, I just happened to be out in California a couple weeks ago, and I was sitting with a group of professors and at lunch, the lunch time conversation moves to -- you know, in California, we had overcrowding of prisons. We're not putting people in prison anymore. And the rate of break-ins in our neighborhood has just gone up. And the word it out, that unless you commit a violent
offense, you're not going to prison.

So this -- you know, these are just people talking at lunch not about policies, just saying this is what's going on in our neighborhood and everyone's getting broken in. What's your response to that?

MS. DEBERRY: The data just doesn't bear that. The program I just talked about where we have the social worker engaged -- we've seen a seven percent reduction in recidivism of the people that we gave reduced prison sentence to. So I expect that that will continue to bear results. But even if you look at the numbers on a state wide basis, which is discussed in the paper, you'll see that there's zero increase in violent crime, which I would posit is what all of us care most about. And there's only a very nominal increase in auto related thefts -- breaking into a car to steal the change in the ash tray or the radio or to steal the vehicle -- and that even -- very, very minor. And we're now three years into this, so it's not as if you know, it's six months in and we just can't tell what people are going to do.
Many people have been released from prison. Many people have been given a sentence at the county level and released from county jail and returned to society, so that increase is so nominal and I would posit not enough to make -- shouldn't be enough for us to turn back on what seems to be working in all other respects.

MR. RAPHAEL: We did an evaluation of crime trends in California and as we said, our estimate is maybe an additional property crime, motor vehicle theft per year not served. There is a similar large decrease in Italy in 2006 associated with collective clemency, and the drop was kind of comparable in magnitude to what happened in California, and you see a very big spike in crime, on the order of 18 felonies per year not served, of people that are released. It's a fairly sizeable impact. The difference is, in Italy, the incarceration rate inclusive of those jails before they're collective pardon in 2006, was about 103 per 100,000. In California, when you add the jail population, it's almost 700 plus, per 100,000, so it's
a seven times difference. And so when we're coming from such a high base, we have a lot more to work with, in terms of who's going to be let out, and it shows in the evaluation.

MS. KEARNEY: You mean the marginal person in jail in California is less likely to be a repeat offender or violent offender?

MR. RAPHAEL: Yes, right.

MS. KEARNEY: Okay, so I'm going to move on to Professor Daniel Nagin. And you've written a lot about policing and deterrence, and of course, one of the reasons we rely on our prisons is not just to punish people but to deter crime. So I'm interested in hearing from you to the extent to which you think where we are in our rates of incarceration is an effective place to be in terms of deterring crime, and if there are more effective ways to do that?

MR. NAGIN: If you don't mind, I have some remarks written out. I'm less competent than Cristine to talk extemporaneously so I'll need --

MS. KEARNEY: Forgery?
MR. NAGIN: Actually, I'm here in two capacities. One is, as Melissa said, in my capacity as an individual researcher, like Michael and Steve does a lot of research on crime policy. The second is, as a representative of the National Research Council's Committee on the cause and consequences of high incarceration rates. That committee was chaired by Jeremy Travis, who's the president of John Jay College, and it's vice-chair was Bruce Western of Harvard University. And the report was released yesterday at just about this time. So let me begin with my bottom line. The conclusion is about the causes and consequences of high incarceration rates in the U.S. that were reached by Michael and Steve, closely corresponding, I will say eerily closely corresponding with the conclusions of the committee. They also closely square with my own conclusions, particularly as they pertain with ways to control crime, as ways crime control policies should change, in the United States. For two decades, particularly...
for violent crime, we've had declining crime rates in the United States, and for an even longer time, four decades, prison populations have been rising throughout the country. We have now one percent of the adult population is behind bars. Across the political spectrum, there is a recognition that the social and economic costs of incarceration, at least at its present scale, are not affordable. Can we reduce incarceration rates without triggering more crime? Here, I'm a little bit less sanguine than perhaps some people here. I do think the answer is yes, but only if we do not repeat the mistakes of the past.

More than 250 years ago, Cesare Beccharia, an Italian philosopher and politician who wrote extensively on crime, admonished that it is better to prevent crimes than punish them. But the U.S. response to rising crime rates in the 1960s through the 1980s was predicated on two fault premises that ignored Beccharia's warning. The first was that the police were impotent to prevent crime, and the second
was, that sending more people to prison for longer periods of time was an effective and efficient way to prevent crime. Conventional wisdom is that the certainty of punishment, not its severity, is a more effective deterrent. Evidence, though, gives us the correct form of the certainty principle, and that is that the certainty of apprehension, not the severity of the ensuing consequence, is the effective deterrent. This conclusion has two important implications.

First, it makes clear the fallacy of claims that punishments like mandatory minimum sentencing deter a crime. There's simply no evidence that increasing the risk of imprisonment, post-apprehension and conviction, serves as a deterrent. Likewise, there is good evidence that lengthy sentences are ineffective in deterring crime, and are not efficient ways of preventing crime by incapacitation, for precisely the reasons that Steve laid out. So like with Raphael and Stoll's -- the report of the committee confirms these conclusions. In my own
view -- my own view now is that mandatory minimum sentences need to be repealed and sentence lengths reduced to reduce prison populations.

Second, the revised certainty principle places effective use and deployment of the police at center stage in deterring crime. There is much evidence that proactive policing methods such as focusing police presence in crime hot spots is effective in preventing crime, not just displacing it. As we scale back prison populations, it's important that we make more effective use of the police in ways that provide for safety in a democratic society, not a safe police state. Proactive policing tactics have potential negative consequences. Stop, question and frisk for example, has been the source of enormous controversy, not only in New York City, but also in other places around the world, largely because the police are stopping, questioning and frisking -- the people they are stopping are often young minority men.

Is SQF effective in reducing crime?

Evidence to answer this question is scant. But
evidence leads us to see that that's the wrong question anyway. The right question that we should ask is, is stop question and frisk more effective than other forms of proactive policing in preventing crime? There are good reasons for deep skepticism about the relative effectiveness, at least as it's practiced in New York. First, police effectiveness in responding to crime rests heavily on the willingness of citizens to report crimes and identify perpetrators. Policing tactics that alienate communities reduce the willingness of its citizens to cooperate with the police. Second, SQF produce far too many arrests for minor offenses such as possessions of small amounts of marijuana. These arrests clog the court system with trivial cases, and they also needlessly scar the records of those who are arrested, limiting their future employability and exposing them to increased legal risk. Practical policing methods such as SQF need to have less noxious effects on communities. This requires that officers receive proper training in how to do SQFs in ways that are respectful and
minimize their impact if no weapon is found. SQFS have to be done within the parameters of the law, there has to be an articulable suspicion that the individual has a weapon and the individual should be given the reasons why the stop and frisk was done. Police also need to spend time explaining their initiatives to the community telling them what they're doing and why.

In 2003, Supreme Court Justice Kennedy made the following observation about imprisonment rates in the U.S. "Our resources are misspent, our punishment is too severe, and our sentences too long". Last fall, Attorney General Holder observed, "Too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, for no good law enforcement reason". They're right. We need to implement the policy changes laid out in the Raphael and Stoll report and the NRC Committee report. To that, I would only add, that in parallel, there needs to be a national effort to bring greater use of police to prevent crime in a fashion that provides for public safety in a democratic society, not a police
state.

MS. KEARNEY: Thank you. So I'm going to turn to Michael Stoll, one of the authors of this proposal. I think Dan's given us a lot to -- or you, a lot to respond to here. In particular, let's say we're successful at getting your proposal out there and states adopt it and reform their sentencing and fewer people are sent to prison. What is the alternative that you're proposing states should rely on --?

MR. STOLL: Right, right.

MS. KEARNEY: To keep the crime rates down?

MR. STOLL: And what we propose is not inconsistent with what Dan just said. Again we are proposing to use prison beds for only those that pose the greatest risk to society and in doing so, we could lower the incarceration rate without appreciably affecting crime, but in doing so, we believe that there's also budgetary savings, especially at the state level, with which we could do other kinds of compensatory social investments to crime fight as
well. This was, I think echoed in the report recently released by the urban institute as part of the justice re-initiative -- reinvestment initiative set of points too, about using saving smartly to do other kind of crime fighting. So what kind of alternative crime fighting could we do? Well first, we could look at the criminal justice system itself, in particular at parole and probation and to make those enterprises much more effective in reducing recidivism. One of the big ideas in that field now has been generated by my colleague at UCLA named Mark Kleiman who has proposed this idea that Dan just talked about, about swift and certain punishment, and that if there's greater coordination between criminal justice, between probation of parole and the police in identifying and bringing those that violate the terms of their parole or probation quickly to the courts to be sanctioned, that seems to change their behavior relatively quickly, and if it doesn't, sanctions that increase in its punitativeness, seem to have that affect too, in reducing recidivism and helping probationers and
parolees make smarter decisions. So that seems to be a particularly fruitful role. But looking at how we do business in the juvenile courts also matters, too. There's a pretty important study by Aizer and Doyle that suggests that for the most hard to serve men, who are first time offenders, when they've been randomly assigned to a set of judges, those boys that were sentenced to detention ended up not graduating from a high school less often, and going into an adult prison at a much higher rate than those that weren't sentenced to detention. And this is a random assignment, which says that the youth authority or prison itself has a criminogenic affect.

MS. KEARNEY: As compared to the kids who do similar stuff in crime.

MR. STOLL: Exactly, these are same hard to serve boys. Some are sentenced to prison, or detention, and some aren't. And those that went and did time, had the outcome that I talked about. So detention and prison itself could have criminogenic affects that are, I think, counter to the sort of...
social mission of why we're using prison to control crime. So how can we divert? Well one of the ideas about diverting hard to serve kids, I think is going to be proposed by Jens and Anuj, later today, where behavioral modification for those in high risk groups and changing the risk-reward and the time dimensions of their decisions, I think has promising results. But that's for those that are involved in crime. But the big question is, how do we deter people from crime, and I think Dan did talk about the idea that police staffing levels matter a lot. The best empirical evidence by Levitt and others from University of Chicago suggests that higher levels of staffing per set of residents in a locale does have tremendous crime fighting effects, but it says nothing about the kind of police. And I think, hopefully we are past the point where we are proposing stop and frisk in New York or in Los Angeles, benign neglect and then forced response when a crime is reported. And that we move more towards community type policing for lack of a better term, where police agencies are
heavily involved in the social fabric of a community, and build social capital, particularly with institutions and residents in vulnerable communities. That seems to have powerful affects. When we look at the institution of some form of community policing in Boston and New York, and in Los Angeles in the early 2000 period, we see tremendous declines in crime above and beyond what other big cities had experienced, that suggests that the kind of policing that one does too. But the emergence of smart policing also matters too. So the use of geographic information systems, the use of new theories of deterents, such as concentrated deterents, which Dan talked about -- all those seem to be new ways that we could smartly and humanely police in ways that achieve I think what we're trying to achieve, which is low crime, without also having the collateral costs of lost faith in some of our institutions. So that's on the criminal justice side. But we could do things outside of the criminal justice side too. And one of the big ideas that I think many states are flirting with, is the idea of universal
Pre-K. So the benefit costs of crime reduction for those are tremendous. Having early investments in high quality education for kids matters, which also suggests that being in school matters too, and there's a lot of good evidence that after school programs -- after school is the time period in which juveniles are more likely to commit crimes, particularly when they have little to do. So having effective after school programs, having effective programs that keep kids in school -- all of these have shown to have high benefit for cost with respect to crime fighting, and much bigger than the benefit cost of present, even with moderate incarceration rate.

MS. KEARNEY: Great, so there's a lot of what you mentioned that I want to come back to. In particular there are two different motivations floating around here. One is, perhaps our heavy use of incarceration is not the most effective crime fighting tool but you've also raised the possibility that in fact it was cost. So the example is kids being sent to detention, that's actually bad for them.
So I want to come back to that. But before I do, I want to get a police viewpoint here. So we're going to rely heavily on the police. You've mentioned community policing. So Police Chief Dean Esserman, New Haven. You implemented community policing in the early nineties. What's your reaction to all this?

MR. ESSERMAN: My first reaction is, I found the people who were going to fight for my budget at the city board of alders. And we'll be inviting you to speak for the police budget. And I want to thank Secretary Rubin for inviting me. I'm happy to be here. And I was thinking that in the 1967 year, the President of the United States, President Johnson, convened the Commission, Crime in a Free Society. It was a seminal Presidential Commission. And in those two years, that report that was generated in 1969, the opening line was, "There's too much crime for the health of the nation". And all these years later, I'm sitting in the nation's capital and the conversation is, is there too many prisons and prisoners for the health of the nation? We have come a long way, and I
don't know if any police chiefs were part of that Commission, but many of us studied it. So here we are all these years later and I think about that. And I think about what I've heard. Policing has changed. Policing has become a more thoughtful and engaged profession, once isolated, so that I feel that I'm in good company here, and I'm not sure that that many police chiefs of the cities across the country would be disagreeing with what they heard. I'll comment for a minute. I'll tell two stories, because I love to tell stories, because I've been told so many.

MS. KEARNEY: People like police stories.

MR. ESSERMAN: Yes, and they're not about me, so they're good ones. The first is a story of a young police officer, joins the job, comes out of the academy, they're on their beat and where I've returned to New Haven as chief after two decades. I was there in the early nineties when we built the community policing program, and I was brought back to rebuild it two years ago. And we are the last city in the nation that I know of that we've recommitted to community policing.
policing in such a way that when you graduate the police academy and it doesn't matter who you are and what your last name is, even Esserman, you walk a beat for the first year of your life before you go in a police car. Everyone, without exception, adopts a beat and walks it for the first year of their life to build relationships, and perhaps to build humility -- a commodity that is lost with the power of the police shield. So the first story is a young officer is walking their beat, and they're looking great. They still fit into that uniform, a memory I have lost long ago. And they get their first big arrest. They chase the guy and they get him. And you know, rob -- broke into a car, robbed an old lady, got caught jumping out of a house, you name it -- the real deal. Feels like a million bucks, got the handcuffs on him, brings him into the station and brings him upstairs to detectives to prosecute -- excuse me -- we do still defer to prosecutors -- process, not prosecute. And they're snickering. The cops, the old detectives -- and he's looking, you know, did he scuff his buster browns? Is
his shirt pulled out? Did he tear his pants? You know, why are the old guys laughing at him when he's processing this prisoner? And finally, some old detective condescends to actually speak to a rookie, and says those famous words to break the ice. Rookie, you're such an asshole. And you know, you're not sure how to react to that as a rookie. You're often called that as a new chief as well, so I know those words. And they go -- what are you trying to prove kid? What are you running after this guy for? What are you wasting all your effort for? We just had him in here last week, arresting him. And for that moment, this young rookie who thought they were changing the world, meets the world of police cynicism, as their expectation collides with reality that they will spend their career re-arresting the same people forever. And that in fact, whether it's a narcotics arrest and prosecution and incarceration, or another, the number one arrest in America is a re-arrest -- is arresting someone again that you've arrested before. If this was a panel on corrections, the number one
incarceration in America is a re-incarceration, right? I went to Dartmouth, and now I have an adjunct, only adjunct, they remind me, faculty appointment at Yale Law School, and the Alumni Association is nothing compared to the prison alumni association. It is a powerful alumni organization in prisons, that keep on coming back their entire life. So the first story is about the young officer who meets this enormous cynicism and unfortunately and often embraces it. And what is the reaction when expectation collides with reality? It's often fury -- real anger. You don't believe in what you're doing anymore. Sometimes you take justice into your own hands. Sometimes you create a parallel justice system, or you just stay cynical.

A lot of wonderful things happen too, because the CS involved in enforcement of the law is really to miss the point of what police spend most of their lives doing. I've been in uniform for a lot of years, like Mr. Rubin said -- four cities I've been a police chief in America, for 22 years. I never shot
anybody. But these hands have delivered eight babies, because that's what they needed the police to do those eight nights. So we have a different relationship than people think. But part of it is intimate, even intimate with the people we arrest. So the first story is about that young cop who seems to think they are changing the world with an arrest, with the old cynics upstairs laughing at him, that he just arrested and processing someone who they had arrested and processed last week.

The second story is more personal. My oldest graduated college and got a job, and I'm an honest police chief, so I couldn't afford to buy him a car for graduation, so I bought him a bicycle. He moved here for a little while. And the third or fourth week he -- someone clipped the chain on his bike and stole it on the banister -- the apartment he was living in. Who do you think's the first person my son called?

MS. KEARNEY: You?

MR. ESSERMAN: Called his dad, a thousand
miles away across how many states. Now why do you think that, if the son of an American police chief wouldn't have an instinct to call 911, anyone else would? Why? So my son called his dad. And do you think my instinct was quickly hang up the phone and call 911 because I want my friend Cathy Lanier, the chief here to have a, of course, a courteous, telephone response, a prompt police response, a good police report, so they can have good crime data, to do good predictive policing, because they'll pick up good crime patterns? That's the last thing on my mind. I said, don't worry about it. Are you okay? Yeah, we'll take care of it. Another unreported crime on the streets of Washington, D.C. But if you think about it, he did report it, right? He reported it to someone he knew. And that -- that is what has revolutionized thinking about American policing. The birth of community policing was the realization that we had become strangers in the community. And what I have learned through these old eyes over all these years is that none of us are strangers in the criminal
justice system. The police know the prosecutors and the prosecutors know the police. The corrections officers know the judges and the judges know the cops, and we all know each other. And we all know our clients. There's little stranger relationships. We know the people we've arrested before we've arrested them, and long after they go away and come back. We know each other well, and in the community policing berth, we realize the consequence in the post-modern era of police moving into police cars with radios and 911 systems being born and the first Contract with America was not coined here in Washington, D.C. The first Contract with America was the contract between the police and the citizenry -- you call, we come -- 911. Citizens step back and let us do it. Turns out we forgot to get to know each other anymore. So, what have we learned and how would American police chiefs respond? Well, it's easier responding out of uniform, out of my jurisdiction, far away from New Haven today. But I think most police chiefs of the cities across the country would actually be receptive to what
they're hearing today, and not oppositional. That you just need a couple years doing the work to hear that the rhetoric doesn't match the reality. And I think the great chasm is the world of rhetoric and what we hear and on the other side of that abyss is the world of reality and what we know. I think the people on this panel are speaking truth. They're speaking what we know. And what we know is that we touch all too many people. We touch them all too often and we touch them all too hurtfully, and that we need to understand that. Perhaps we need to touch less. Perhaps we need to know that prison isn't the only resort and that we need to act on what we know instead of what we hear. Thank you.

MS. KEARNEY: So I want to respond in a way that now is going to -- I'm almost thinking is cynical, which is a bit weird for me, because I'm not a cynical person at all, but you're saying --

MR. ESSERMAN: Become a cop.

MS. KEARNEY: I mean, you -- so I'm hearing, okay, you keep picking up the same guys, you keep
picking up the same guys, and so how come my reaction isn't, gosh, it's not that we're putting too many people in jail, because this guy keeps doing the same thing, on the street. Maybe we're just not doing a good job with them when they're in jail.

MR. ESSERMAN: We're not.

MS. KEARNEY: So does that -- does that call for sentencing reform or prison reform?

MR. ESSERMAN: You know, that's a good question. I think it calls for both. I think that, I didn't learn as a lawyer and as a police chief what works in punishment. I learned it as a parent. Swift, certain, and short.

MS. KEARNEY: Okay.

MR. ESSERMAN: There's nothing swift, there's nothing certain, there's nothing short, about punishment in America. When we discipline our children at home, it's not weeks locked in your bedroom, and it's not take a reservation and we're going to address this punishment nine months after you dropped your fork in the dining room, or forgot to do
your homework. But that's how we punish, right? But there's also, in my feeling, I don't -- I have no problem putting people in prison. I've put a lot in prison, and maybe, you know, I tell clergy who I work with very closely, that I believe in a ministry, but some people need a prison ministry. But maybe I'm up here today; maybe Secretary Rubin really brought me up here to do my penance. So maybe what I've learned over these years is that most everyone that I've sent away comes back worse. You know, prison doesn't just chain the body. It chains the mind. You don't come back better. But you keep on coming back, and back, and back. It's a -- it's not right that we've coined it for Americans, the Department of Correction, because nobody's getting corrected. There are anecdotes of few and far between and so we make TV movies about it, because it's that unusual for the most part. It's a destructive place. So I think you have to spend a life in the business like I have to see the results, to be open to accept failure and say, you're craving ideas, you're looking, you want to
hear, even at the peril of your own job. At the risk of your own job, you are willing to listen to other ideas. And I've been persuaded.

MS. KEARNEY: Yes, I appreciate that so much Chief, and the District Attorney of San Francisco, the former police chief and colleague and this chief and they share a lot in common and one of the things that he talks a lot about is, the system we have is not sustainable, right? We're learning that, and the paper says that. We can't afford economically what we're doing and socially, we could really never afford what we've been doing, and we're now starting, I hope to understand that in this society. And so the question is then, what replaces that, right -- because you do still need an accountability matrix. There are people who still step over the line and there has to be some response to that presumably. One of the things that we're learning from policing, because if -- for those of you not in criminal justice, unfortunately prosecution is far behind policing in terms of using data or looking for new ideas for how
we do our work, and one of the concepts we're exploring, because I believe this conversation goes beyond just incarceration, but the whole criminal justice process I think is harmful. And so, even if we decide we're going to start to abandon prison for those that don't require that, what does the rest of the court system and the criminal justice process look like, if we're moving towards doing this work better?

And one of the things we've started doing is letting the community hear some of our cases, rather than having ourselves proceed over those. So we go out into the community and we do night court. Now we train community members. They can be merchants, they can be students, they could be homemakers -- we train them in the ideas of restorative justice and how to facilitate a hearing. And it's not a fact finding hearing. The individual has to go because they're accepting that in fact they did steal the bologna, or break the window. But what the process is about is about the community saying, that's harmful to us. We don't like it when you do that. And here's what we
want you to do to make that better. Those hearings happen within two weeks of the crime, and they happen at one third of the cost of what it takes for us to go through the process in the courtroom, to get to a relatively similar result. They happen pre-charging, so the individual doesn't end up with a criminal record as a result of going through this process. So if it's somebody who stepped over the line for the first time, no harm, no foul. You no longer have to declare the broken window as a misdeed you did in your twenties and have to account for it every time you apply for a job. And these types of systems are more sustainable, right? When we strengthen a community to resolve its own problems, we get much more mileage out of that than when we do more of a stranger model, where we say, we're going to abdicate the responsibility for that and let somebody else decide who's good and who's bad in our neighborhood. Most people already know that. And so for those lower level cases we've been able to do that and I think we need to continue to iterate and explore in that space.
What does that look like with a more serious case? We're doing that in the juvenile context with more serious cases. So I think there are a lot of opportunities here to draw on the strength of community rather than relying on the criminal justice system to start to solve these problems. We have a waiting list for people wanting to be adjudicators, because everybody feels they want to engage in that process. That's exciting to them. I could respond to a guy that's tagged the wall on my store. I'm thrilled about that. And the outcome could be that he goes and works in a non-profit that teaches young people how to paint murals. I feel really good about that. He's going to repaint the wall, make a letter of apology to the owner of the store and may now have a relationship that's built on a positive experience instead of a negative one where they're both faulting each other for what happened in that process. Those are good outcomes. And I think those start to reduce the reliance on not just police but prosecutors and on prisons. And I think those are the kinds of
conversations we as a country need to be having.

All right, you know what -- I'm going to -- we have some questions that have come in over twitter, so I'm going to pose these. Here's -- crime used to be much worse in our country. Are the panelists concerned that if sentencing reform happens, we'll go back to the high crime rates in past decades? We'll get Dan and then --

MR. NAGIN: Yes, let me respond to that. It's important -- very important to understand that the imprisonment rate is not a policy variable per se. It's actually the outcome of policies about who we decide to send to prison and for how long. And those policies, the impact of those policies are different. They're heterogeneous. They're more or less effective. And we know now that certain policies related to mandatory minimum sentencing and lengthy prison sentences that are used, applied widely, not selectively -- that we know that those are ineffective or efficient ways to prevent crime, and so those are the things that we need to go at correcting, and
unfortunately, I think that there's not yet the political will to do that. There's some promising steps.

And then, I would just also say, returning to my point about policing, and the point that was made about touching. The key here is not so much necessarily needing more police, although I'll come and testify to that, it's how they're used. And being used and mobilized in a way that prevents crime and sometimes that will necessarily require police to make arrests. There are bad guys out there that have to be arrested. But more generally, is thinking about metrics that measure police effectiveness, all the way down to the office level, in ways that you can judge how successful they are in preventing crime, not just making arrests.

MR. RAPHAEL: So just to speak specifically to this crime issue -- it is the case that you can find fairly large effects of increases in incarceration on crime in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. The increases in the 1990s have been
considerably less effective. And there are lots of actually growing numbers of examples where we've seen large declines in incarceration without corresponding increases so to return to California -- that we had a realignment reform which has reduced our prison population from 161,000 by roughly 27,000 people. A third of those people are in county jails so it was offset to a certain degree, but there's a lot more people on the street. If we look at the incarceration rate today in California, it's where it was before we passed three strikes in 1994 and our crime rate is basically no -- not that much higher. There's a little bit of impact in property crime, but we have very low crime rates historically. Texas has brought down its prison population from over 700 per 100,000 to 600 per 100,000, has not experienced a crime increase. New York has drawn down its prison population to below 300 per 100,000 and has not experienced a big crime increase, so -- that's not to say that the people in prison are not criminally active. Of course, many of them are. But when we're
incarcerating at such a large scale, there's room to do other things. There's a lot of heterogeneity among people that do time, and not everybody is a highly criminally active person.

MR. STOLL: I think the other point to make is that, as Steve and I have been arguing, there is a diminishing benefit to incarceration and higher though your incarceration rate -- but there's tremendous, not only direct costs but there's collateral costs.

MS. KEARNEY: Right.

MR. STOLL: All of which were highlighted in the National Academy of Sciences Report. So, but I think the other point to make is that --

MS. KEARNEY: Can you just -- again, what's the evidence, really. Like, just, let's do it for the crowd. What do we know about the collateral costs?

MR. NAGIN: Well, they're on families and communities. There's a good body of research that says particularly, in disadvantaged communities that when you incarcerate males in the community above a
certain percentage, that actually further destabilizes the neighborhood, rather than make it more secure. There's good evidence that having an incarcerated parent lowers income, that lowers the quality of parenting for kids in families with an incarcerated parent. There's the direct collateral costs on those with records, with respect to their inability to find work, find work quickly, and earn a living in order to achieve whatever their goals are. There's direct clear consequence on voting and other kinds of civil rights infringements. Most states ban those with records from being able to take social welfare programs, or for getting low income housing assistance. Most ban those from voting. That has tremendous consequences on electoral outcomes. So there's a whole host -- there's effects on health. So there's a whole host of collateral consequences that aren't measured by the direct cost of incarceration and imprisonment itself, that society, meaning all of us, are paying for from our mass incarceration policy.

So I think that's the other point to make. But I also
think that there's a benefit cost trade off that we're making just like we make with other kind of policy decisions. So in our analysis, by selectively reducing incarceration, we don't find that there will be big effects on violent crime. Maybe some on property crime, but is society willing to trade that off for a lower collateral consequence for not having mass incarceration in the United States. I mean, we consciously decide for example, to raise the miles per hour from 55 to 65, knowing that that has a direct cost on deaths from vehicle accidents. Now that's been reduced because of the increased safety of cars, but we still have that. But society is saying we're willing to trade that off for the benefit of increased commute -- or decreased commute times to work and other kinds of benefits from travel. So society's making these choices all the time, and we think that posing in this way, I think there'll probably be more buy in that we could selectively smartly reduce incarceration to get these benefits without having the same costs.
MS. KEARNEY: Great. All right. So we have a lot of questions coming in. A few of them are about the role of for profit prisons and the prison industrial complex, which I now know is a thing, having worked on this for a few weeks. What do you have to say about this? What's the role of the prison industrial complex here?

MR. STOLL: Let me just make first a comment on that and actually Steve is much more of an expert on this than I. It's important to keep in mind that these for profit prisons represent a very small fraction of the total number of prisoners. And they certainly have a financial interest in this and by all reports, lobby to protect those interests. But it's also the case that there are political interests in the state systems, you know, my understanding is that in California, the guards and the union is among the most powerful going and in politicians who represent world communities where there are prisons and they're one of the big employers, they also have a stake in it. So, but the point is that there are large numbers
of people who have a financial stake in this scale of imprisonment and trying to rationally bring this down is going to have to deal with the politics of that.

MR. RAPHAEL: I would add, it is a small percentage of inmates are housed in a private prison. In some states, it's actually fairly sizeable, and there certainly are constituencies. Any set of practice generates constituencies. But I think the prime sort of set of policy choices that have put us where we are today were kind of our own doing. And now we've created beneficiaries and we have inertia associated with it and resistance, but I don't think that that should be an insurmountable goal to thinking through corrections reform essentially.

MS. DEBERRY: Could I -- I just want to add on to that. I get the sense that's motivating that question, and I would ask people that put their focus there to look at the perverse incentives in our government system. And I think that's the point of the paper here, is that, we have multiple incentives to send people to state prison and at the county
level, because as the paper points out, as myself, as a local prosecutor, if somebody crosses my path and I can send them to state prison, the state pays that bill. My county doesn't pay that bill. It doesn't come out of my budget or my county's budget, and then, somebody that we see as a potential problem for us as a community and a society, is now the state's problem, it's no longer our problem. So it's actually very -- a very economic choice to make, to say I'd rather push that cost on to somebody else. And what the paper is talking about is trying to align the costs with that decision, so that when I send somebody to prison, I pay for that. My county pays for that. So that I only send the people that I really believe that cost is warranted. And until you do that, you're not going to --

MR. RAPHAEL: You wouldn't have to pay if somebody committed a heinous crime, but, if there's a wobbler.

MS. DEBERRY: Right.

MR. NAGIN: Let me just make a point -- a
very, very important point that Michael and Steven make in their book and this paper, is that to understand that this rise in prison population was mostly having to do with policy choices. And the reason I emphasize that is the policy choices that were made that resulted in these increases -- there can be selected policy choices made particularly with regard to the kinds of sentences and so forth that we know are ineffective that we need to begin undoing them. That's a policy choice as well.

MS. KEARNEY: So I'm going to -- we have time for one final question. I'm going to have to ask you to be brief in your response. It's a very specific policy question. Could the Californians comment on the appropriate role of the state in a realigned system in terms of oversight, funding and system performance? We got three Californians.

MR. RAPHAEL: I'll offer some, so the realignment has transferred money to the counties and has given the counties pretty great discretion in terms of how they're going to run their system, so
there are counties that are emphasizing rehabilitation and there are counties that are emphasizing incapacitation and jails. And my read on the subject is -- there was a lot more resistance at first but there's more, we can work with this, especially given that there are resources and we can do the job and of course, counties differ according to their political philosophies. It's still a work in progress. There are efforts, particularly by the Public Policy Institute of California to try to see what the counties are doing and see what's working, but the counties are talking to one another and one interesting thing is that through these three entry councils, all the different agencies within the local criminal justice are probably talking to each other at levels that wasn't happening before this reform.

MS. KEARNEY: All right, so we'll end on that, and thank our authors and out panelists for a very important discussion.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right, thanks everyone for coming. This is a really exciting panel. I'm
having sort of a fun week with research and sort of thinking about how to help people change patterns of behavior, and I just really love this particular panel and the work they're doing and the presentation we're about to hear. So please join me in welcoming the entire panel, and Jens Ludwig is going to start us off with a big presentation of his work. Thank you.

MR. LUDWIG: Thanks. Good afternoon. Thanks so much to The Hamilton Project for organizing this and for having us. I'm going to talk about a project that Anuj Shah, my colleague at the University of Chicago and I have been doing, with a large team of people, to try and figure out ways of preventing crime and violence without having to put people in prison. Anuj and I have been telling ourselves that we were sent here because within the team, we are the handsome ones. That was a joke. If the lighting was better you would realize how hilarious the joke was.

I wanted to start off, before talking about the work, by orienting you to what the problem looks like on the south side of Chicago, where I live, but
not just the south side of Chicago. So this is a more or less randomly selected example from the Chicago Tribune. This happened in about three miles from my University of Chicago office two summers ago, June 2nd. It was a Saturday, 2012, at 73rd and Coles Avenue at 3 in the afternoon. Two groups of kids are woofing at each other in the middle of the street about whether a kid in one of the groups stole a bike from one of the other groups. Two groups start to separate so there's no self-defense rationale for what happens next, which is someone takes a 38 semi-automatic out of their waistband and then fires into the other group and hits a 16 year old named Jamal Locket in the chest. Ambulance comes, races him down Lakeshore Drive to the emergency room where he's pronounced dead and two weeks later, the Cook County States' Attorney files first degree murder charges against the alleged shooter, a 17 year old named Calvin Carter.

Now why does this sort of thing happen? You need to have some sense of why it happens to have some
sense of how you can prevent it. Lots of intuitive theories come to mind. One sort of intuitive theory that comes immediately to mind is that the shooter must be deeply committed to the idea of violence to do something like this over a stolen bicycle. Another idea that intuitively comes to mind is that the decision to pull the trigger must be driven by root causes or maybe driven by root causes that are already so deeply entrenched by the time people reach adolescence or early adulthood that it will be hard to move people away from the place from where that decision is coming. There's a lot wrapped up in these ideas, including the idea that the shooter is different from the rest of us. Another idea wrapped up in this is that the shooter decided, consciously decided to pull the trigger. Anuj and I and our team have a different idea about what might be driving tragic events like this in Chicago and cities around the country and I think the easiest way to explain this idea to you would be to do a little game that would take maybe twenty seconds, but it's only going
to work if I have audience participation.

   SPEAKER: Yes.

   MR. LUDWIG: Excellent. That was my co-author who said that. It makes it less impressive.

   (Laughter)

   MR. LUDWIG: All right, so here is how the game is going to work. I'm going to show you an object in the middle of the slide and I want you to call out the color of the object. Okay? So let's do an easy one for starters. Are you guys ready? You have the instructions. People -- my University of Chicago undergrads can do better than that for a Friday morning class. We have to do better than that. All right, it's only going to work if you really participate. I'm going to whip through this really quickly. Okay, ready? Call out the color of the object. Here we go.

   AUDIENCE: Red green blue. (laughter)

   MR. LUDWIG: Okay, why did we do that?

   Well, one reason is to test your reading level.

   Here's the real reason that we did this. What
happened there? You guys might have called out the color if you had just caught yourself and slowed down a little bit. What happened is all of you have developed an automatic response to immediately read a word when you see it, which is usually adaptive in your daily lives. But sometimes gets you into trouble, like circumstances like this where you had different instructions, and this idea that a lot of our behavior is driven by automatic responses that we don't even think about is very nicely laid out by Daniel Kahneman's book "Thinking Fast and Slow", for those of you who have read that. If you think back to June 2nd in South Shore, on the south side of Chicago, it's possible that something similar might be going on there. It's possible that the 17 year old, Calvin Carter, who was alleged to have done the shooting, might have developed an automatic response that says something like, I never let my friends down, or I can't let people in my neighborhood think that I'm a pushover, which might be hugely adaptive for most of the circumstances that these kids face growing up.
every day, but leads to tragedy when you have a 38 semi-automatic in your waistband. And the idea behind the interventions that we've been studying have basically been to explore the possibility that we might be able to reduce at least some of the tragic crime and violence that we see in cities across the country, but just working with kids to get them to slow down and stop look and listen before they actually act.

This is a hypothesis. That's just the hypothesis. We've been doing randomized trials of the sort that provide gold standard evidence in medicine in the city of Chicago to try and see whether that hypothesis is actually true. And our very first randomized trial of this was done in partnership with our Chicago area non-profit named Youth Guidance, of a program called "Becoming a Man", which is basically about getting kids to learn when they need to stop, look and listen, slowdown in high stakes situations, which found that one year program participation reduced violent crime arrests by 44 percent and
increased expected high school graduation rates by 10 to 20 percent. We've done two follow up trials of interventions that included BAM as a component, which were encouraging, and another follow up trial that studied a different version of this, different curriculum, different program providers, in the context of the juvenile detention center, also with encouraging results.

Now if these results could be achieved at scale, the implication would be that we could get benefits to society that are worth from five to thirty times the cost of funding the interventions. The results are encouraging, but there's more that we need to know. And one of the most important things that we need to know is if we can take this to scale outside of the city of Chicago. And so our proposal starts off with the idea of spending the first five years, or the next five years, figuring out, basically trying to reverse engineer these programs, and figure out what the key active ingredients are and so that we can then hand the program logic off to other program providers.
around the country, for them to deliver it and adapt it to the local context, and test it in different cities around the country that might have a very different flavor to their violence problem from what they have on the south and west side of Chicago. And hopefully by the end of the five year scale up and testing period, we'll be at a stage where we are ready to take this at scale, providing one year of this sort of programming to every adolescent in poverty in the United States would cost about $2 billion a year, is a way to think about how much money that is. I think we spend probably well over $200 billion a year on the criminal justice system, so that would be one-ish percent of total criminal justice spending, to reach every teen in poverty. And I think the results could potentially help not just make progress on the crime problem that has brought us here today, but really transform the life chances of lots and lots of some of the most disadvantaged young people in the United States.

I just want to end with a final observation
about this. For me, the logic behind this type of intervention was really hit home when Anuj and I were in the juvenile detention center in Cook County and staff leader there said to us, he said, you know, 20 percent of the kids in here are just troubled kids. You let them go, they're going to do bad things to other people and you just need to lock them up. This is the staff leader saying this. He said, but the other 80 percent of the kids in here, I always tell them, if I can give you back just ten minutes of your lives, none of you would be here, right? And I think the randomized trials that we've been accumulating in Chicago suggest that it might be something to that idea. Now the heartbreaking part of this is, if you think back to the very first slide that Steve Raphael showed you -- if you think about how we actually responded to the crime problem in the United States since the 1970s, by massively ramping up the number of people behind bars, the hopeful part of that insight is that we might be learning more now about more cost effective and importantly more humane ways of
addressing the problem. Thanks very much.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Thanks Jens. It's a bold and brave researcher who starts with jokes about his own appearance and then goes on to get the entire audience to insult their own intelligence -- so, well done. But this is just a fantastic paper and I really recommend that everybody read it all the way through. It's just packed with interesting detail. We got like a power packed panel to talk about it. So I'll just introduce them along the way. I'll introduce, ask a question and we'll keep going, and then we're going to have a conversation and then when our conversation is winding down, we're going to start taking your questions, and I think that will be, in fact, the conversation that's even more revelatory, because we're really interested in what sort of questions you all have. Anyway, we'll start with Robert Listenbee, the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention for the Department of Justice. And you all do evidence based work in your jobs right now, correct?
MR. LISTERBEE: That's correct.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Can you tell us a little bit about that?

MR. LISTERBEE: Yes, first of all, I'd just like to congratulate our colleagues at the Chicago lab for the work they've been doing with Becoming a Man. We think it has some really promising preliminary results coming out of the work they've been doing, particularly around the research efforts here. When our office began the work there, we supported funding for a study of 100 young men in that area. And that initial research was very promising. I think the results were provided us earlier here, that it reduce violence by I believe about 44 percent, reduced arrests significantly as well. So we thought that there needed to be further research. We've certainly continued to invest in the research, and we found that BAM plus various other match models, or various other components, really does have an impact. But again, we're at a preliminary stage. One of the important research projects that they've undertaken and they've
discussed in great detail in the research document that they gave you today, involves what we call a random control trial. It involves 2,500 young men, ages, I believe, 7th grade -- rather 6th grade through 10th grade. It involves having them research over 2 academic years -- 2013-14 and 2014-15, and looking at what the results are. We hope that these results will give us a better understanding about which specific components of the research diagram actually work best. We know that one specific component, which involves BAM itself, with its elements, plus a second component which involves what we call the match model, which comes out of Boston and involves an educational component -- that match model has had significant results. We understand that it's increased the likelihood that young men are going to finish high school. The match model includes a special tutorial component that works with kids around math itself, and we know that in just six months, it's increased their ability -- the grade levels in math -- by three years, and it's also increased the likelihood that they'll be
in school, reduce truancy, reduce the likelihood that they're going to drop out, increase the number of days that they're in school by almost two and a half weeks, and a number of other positive effects. So we think that this is positive. Our challenge at this point, looking at it from the point of view of an agency that focuses on research and focuses upon actual proven things that work, is that these are preliminary results. We know that we have to have the final results come in before we can recommend that this is an evidence based practice, that it's a research based practice that has proven completely that it can work in the Chicago area, and then of course, we expect that it would be, as was recommended, further research components going on in other parts of the country, to show that it works with different groups of young folks in urban areas, different groups of young folks in rural areas, different groups of young folks in tribal areas -- so that we know that it can go well.

Now we understand that there's no silver bullet. There's no specific model that's going to fit every
child in every circumstance. But we're looking forward to seeing what the final results are from this research, so that we can figure out whether it's the kind of model that we would recommend for major investments and taking to scale. We're not there just yet, but we're really excited about it. We want to commend them for the outstanding work they've done. We want to commend the founders of BAM and what they've done in bringing it to the Chicago lab itself for further research, and we look forward to doing work with them.

I just add a couple of things. We are an organization that focuses upon evidence based programs and research. We have a number of programs that we fund, particularly involving, some involving mentoring. When we look at mentoring, we look at a variety of different kinds of things with mentoring. We look at how we make the appropriate match. We look at how we look at how long the match works and whether this premature, sort of breaking off of the relationship between the mentor and the mentee.
look at a number of other factors that really promote effective mentoring. And so, when we look at the possibility of taking something into scale, we want to be able to say convincingly to Congress and others who are looking at our portfolio, that we know for sure that it's going to work in a lot of different circumstances. We also have developed what we call model programs guide for the office of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention. In that guide we have both promising approaches and evidence based practices. It's a part of a broader initiative of evidence integration that was started by Attorney General Eric Holder and that we're following up on to ensure that we have evidence based programs across our entire spectrum of activities at the office of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention. So we're working hard to ensure that that's well developed and effective before we take programs and send them out across the nation. And when we say across the nation, that's all 50 states, and six territories as far away as Guam and Alaska. So we want to make sure that we
have things that are going to be -- before they can be taken to scale -- that they're going to work in this variety of different circumstances.

One final series of a couple of points here -- we recently commissioned a study by the National Academy of Sciences. That research program provided a report in June of last year. That research document indicated that we need to have a developmental approach to all of our activities to prevent delinquency in this nation. I encourage you all to take a look at it. In addition, the Attorney General's Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence made it clear that trauma is one of the critical problems facing our nation and our children. Sixty percent of our children are exposed to violence on a yearly basis, as victims, as witnesses, and sometimes as offenders. And we need to understand how trauma impacts their lives. It derails normal adolescent development and when it derails, it's hard to get kids back on track. If we don't find appropriate prompt and form care procedures to address their issues and
concerns, then we run into a situation where they kind of go off the rail and many of them, not all of them -- many of them become involved in the juvenile justice system and in the criminal justice system. So we are following a path where we focus on adolescent development, where we focus on trauma and trauma informed care. We know that children need a supportive adult in their lives. They need pro-social environments and they need circumstances where they can exercise independent decision making during the course of their day. If they get those kinds of things, they're very likely to be successful in life.

What we're concerned about, is so many of our kids end up in delinquency facilities, and in those facilities, they're not getting an opportunity to get these kinds of adolescent development experiences, so that they can be successful. We lock up too many of our kids here in this country. We know that the number was approximately 60,000 in 2011 because we did a study at OJJDP of children in custody, and we know that that number's too large --
why? Because two out of three of the kids that are lockup, are kids who are there for non-violent offenses. They're there for truancy in some cases, status offenses; they're there for minor offenses -- many of them misdemeanors. And we know because our studies -- our studies like Pathways to Assistance, have shown us that putting kids in institutions does not necessarily reduce the level of offending that comes thereafter. We know that from the studies. They're very well developed.

We want also just to point out that young people who are in our system sometimes do need to be in confinement. We're not running away from that issue. We understand that some of them need confinement. But that confinement should be the kind of confinement that focuses on adolescent development and encourages them to exercise some judgment while they're in confinement. When they come out the education components ought to transition them to appropriate kinds of educational activities, appropriate kind of aftercare activities, so that they
can go on to live productive and effective lives in our country.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Thank you Administrator -- appreciate that. Elizabeth Glazer is the Director of the Office of Criminal Justice for Mayor Bill de Blasio in New York City and we're hearing about a type of intervention. So, whose job it is? Often we lay people just think about the police whose job it is to prevent violence among these. Should we be changing our thought on that?

MS. GLAZER: Definitely.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Tell me about that. Why?

MS. GLAZER: So I'm slightly more giddy than Bob about Jens and Anuj's work. When I think about it read the report, the words new frontier, watershed moment, kept coming through my head, and for a couple of reasons. One -- and I'm afraid I'm a lawyer so I split it into two parts. One is substantive and one is procedural. But substantively, I think, and to answer your question, I think we have been very used to thinking about the way in which we reduce crime as
we rely on the police, or the way in which we reduce crimes that we rely on police and prosecutors and defense lawyers. More recently we've sort of begun to broaden that spectrum of who we rely upon to providers and others. But as sort of the slides that you saw before, in the first panel have showed you, we're not doing that great a job. We try to the extent that we can, as people come out of prison, to address needs. We try and side prison to do rehabilitation. We try and move those intervention points earlier and earlier, so that when somebody's arrested, we try and off ramp them. If they're not appropriate candidates for what I think some people -- many people on this panel would think, so that they're not affected by the criminogenic issues in prison. But what I think this work shows is that that intervention point should and can come much much earlier -- way before any interaction with the criminal justice system and two, that it doesn't have to be police or prosecutors or defense lawyers or courts or anybody in the criminal justice system who provides that intervention. And so
here we have kids who are growing up in tough neighborhoods and tough circumstances. But the crime fighting tool is education, is recreation, is something completely different than what we usually think of as a crime fighting tool. And I think that to some degree, it's a recognition that crime fighting is really not that much about crime any more. It is about education and housing and health and all kinds of other issues. Because when you look at the areas of distress in our country, crime ends up being a proxy for clusters of all kinds of other issues that end up in one place. And that's not to say that then, what we should be doing, because I think when people say that, the reaction is always, well, you're just talking about root causes, and how can you solve poverty, or hunger in our time. And that's really not what this is about. This is what I think Jens and Anuj's paper shows, is that you are able to take a systemic approach to solving an array of problems well before anybody hits the system.

I think the second piece that I would say.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180  Fax (703) 519-7190
that I find really exciting about this as a practitioner, is what Jens has sort of referred to as the gold standard of experimentation. In law enforcement we use all the language of epidemiology. It's a cancer of crime. We have to cut it out. But we never actually use the methods of science to try to resolve it. And we talk about evidence based practices -- odd that we even use that phrase, as if it would be based on something else. Of course, we better be using evidence based practices. And yet, when we say that, that can cover a wide array of what really works and what doesn't work. And so to have a study like this in which you can have -- you can rely upon the results at the end is incredibly encouraging, because it permits you again, as a practitioner, to go to decision makers, to go to your budget director -- to all the people who are going to make the system work and say, I can show you irrefutable evidence that this thing will work to reduce crime, to increase educational attainments. And that is a tool that we haven't had in criminal justice really until now.
MR. TANKERSLEY: Thank you Liz. Finally, on the panel, delighted that we have Laurence Steinberg who's a psychology professor at Temple University and just one of the real heavyweights in the field of adolescent psychological development and I'd like to maybe focus in a little bit here on the teenage brain, if you would. When is the right time to start these interventions? How early should we be getting to young people to help them make the kind of psychological switches that we're talking about?

MR. STEINBERG: So one of the things I like about this proposal is that it recasts adolescents as a time of inherent problem into a time of opportunity, to intervene, and I think that this is a very important message in the current context in which there's an understandable band wagon for pre-K education. And not to say anything against early childhood education, but I think we need to remind ourselves that that's an investment. It's not an inoculation. And we can't just give our kids early education and then cross our fingers and hope for the
best as they get older. For starters, if we give the current generation of toddlers and young children early education, we still have to worry about everybody who's older than six right now, and what are we going to do about their issues, their education and their problems?

So second reason that I like the proposal has to do with what we're learning about the adolescent brain, and that's that it looks like the adolescent brain is malleable and plastic in ways that we had not realized before. A lot of you are probably familiar with the notion that zero to three as a developmental period is a time when the brain is very plastic and open to intervention and experience. And it looks like there's another wave of brain plasticity during adolescence, particularly in the first half of the adolescent period, so let's say between 10 and 15 or 16 or so. And it also looks like adolescence may be the last opportunity of very high brain plasticity, so if we don't do something during these years, it's going to be very hard to fix problems later on.
Which leads me to another point to try to connect this panel with the earlier panel -- for those of you who weren't here for that, the earlier panel was about reforming criminal justice policy. You can't reform criminal justice policy without reforming juvenile justice policy. There is nobody in the criminal justice system that didn't commit offenses when he or she was a juvenile. Not all of them were in the juvenile justice system but that's just because they didn't get caught, right? So if you want to reform criminal justice policy and practice, you got to start when people are younger.

And I think that an intervention that's designed to help kids develop impulse control, which is how I view what the proposal is arguing for, is the right way to go. And I say that for a couple of reasons. We have a youth violence problem in American that's unparalleled in the developed world. But we have an adolescent problem in American that's unparalleled in the developed world. Our kids lead the world in STDs, they lead the world in unintended
pregnancies, they lead the world in obesity. They're behind most of the developed world in high school achievement. We're not doing a good job in raising teenagers in this country. And a lot of those problems that American teenagers seem to suffer from, disproportionately, have to do with problems in self-regulation, problems in impulse control. So I think the kind of intervention, if there's one amendment I would make, is that I think all American adolescents should get an intervention that's going to help them develop better self-regulation and better impulse control. Sure, let's start with kids that are in the most disadvantaged situations. But this kind of intervention if done effectively, and we'll find out if it's effective through this randomized trial. If it's done effectively, it's going to have positive effects across a lot of different outcomes, not just crime. It should bring down substance abuse. It should bring down obesity. It should bring down unprotected sex. All kinds of problems that can be traced in some way to bad thinking at the time.
somebody is making a problematic decision.

And we know from our research on juvenile offending and the pathways to the system study that Bob mentioned was one that I was involved in. We know that a lot of adolescents, who become chronic offenders, are kids with really bad impulse control. Most kids, and Jens said this in his remarks -- most kids age out of crime. Regardless of what we do to them -- even if we don't do anything to them at all, like 90 percent of them are not going to become adult criminals. So the challenge for us is to try to deal with them while they're adolescents, keep them out of the justice system, because we know that contact with the justice system is bad for you. It's really really bad for you. And the more kids we can keep out of the justice system, the better off we're going to be. And the more kids we can stop from penetrating deeper into the justice system, the better off we're going to be. So interventions with adolescents before they've gotten into trouble are going to be a very important part of crime control policy and justice system.
policy.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Jens, have you done that little calculation here in the last two minutes? How much would it cost to give every American --?

MR. LUDWIG: Well the first thing that I was thinking is my -- I think the only reason that I didn't think of Larry's amendment is my oldest daughter at home is 10. I bet in three years, I would have gotten exactly where Larry is now.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Right.

MR. LUDWIG: You know, it's said the child poverty rate in the United States is twenty-ish percent, plus or minus a few percentage points, so multiply it by five. So that would be about ten billion dollars a year. You know, maybe a little less if there are economies of scale and giving it to everyone. And you know, that is about the Head Start budget-ish, every year. We spend something like 500-ish billion dollars a year on the public K-12 system in the United States. We spend a lot of money on things like Title I assistance to low income schools,
not always necessarily deployed in the most developmentally productive way for kids. So I think in the larger context of what we're trying to spend to help kids any young people develop, that that is not a crazy amount of money in my view. So Larry's amendment happily accepted.

MR. TANKERSLEY: We're just quintupling costs left and right around here today. How do you scale something like this up though? That seems like a really big challenge. I'd like the whole panel to take it. What are the difficult things you've combatted in trying to take a successful pilot program and make it a lot bigger?

MR. LUDWIG: I'll just say a couple things. I think one meta thing that I'll just say is I think this is a key challenge for social policy in general, is how to figure out how to scale up programs, so we are part of a large group of people trying to figure that out. I think that one of the things we often think about is when you hear, for instance, about the successful results of Perry Preschool. Most people in
this room have heard of Perry Preschool, the early childhood program in Ypsilanti, Michigan done in the sixties, was delivered to 50 kids, and one of the things that we always worry about, partly is, it was 50 kids in Ypsilanti, Michigan, and where is Ypsilanti, Michigan anyway? But with 50 kids, you might worry there was just one amazingly good principal or teacher or whatever it is, and you aren't going to find two of her, or him, or whatever it is. The BAM intervention has been done now at a sufficiently large scale where it looks like the nonprofit provider has figured out a way of hiring people that can do it. It's not just the founder at this point. I think the bigger challenge for this is that there are parts of the program recipe that I think are not yet fully written down, partly because we don't understand all the active ingredients but also partly because it's really hard to figure out what parts of the recipe are really critical for the thing to work. And I think that is a generic challenge for social policy interventions in general,
because there are just so many different moving parts. If you -- we had a conversation this morning about this. If you go to McDonald's, you can go to McDonald's in D.C., in Chicago, in Beijing -- it's the same hamburger wherever you go. Partly that's because McDonald's knows exactly what parts of the recipe they have to write down, and in doing that for social policy interventions is much more complex, and that's I think what the whole field is struggling with at this point.

MR. STEINBERG: So one of the nice things about trying to intervene in this age, is that we know where to find the people, right? I mean, they're in school; they haven't started to drop out in huge numbers yet, when they're in early adolescence, so they're kind of a captive population. I mean, the bad news is that the schools are so burdened with other things these days, that it's going to be very hard to convince some schools to devote time to this sort of intervention, but as I mentioned before, for all that we do in American secondary schools, we don't do very
well on achievement related outcomes either. And I'm pretty convinced that we could give up the kind of time during the school day that Jens has proposed without suffering any achievement decrement at all. And in fact, I think we would see an increase in school achievement from this kind of intervention that we don't see from conventional academic intervention. So it's going to take rethinking what schools for adolescents should be and what the purpose of secondary education should be.

MS. GLAZER: I'm sorry; I would just add one other thing to it, which is, you know, there aren't a lot of solutions out there. Either to reduce crime or to increase educational attainment and I think that practitioners are hungry for solutions. And when you have a strong evidence base, and when it's been tried in enough variations, I think people are willing to take those kinds of risks, because they're quite minimal and because doing something -- something that's been proved, is better than doing nothing. And secondary to that, I think one of the advantages, just
to echo Larry, of this intervention, is that you have an institution already established. The tracks are already laid on which this could run. And so it's not like you're building -- okay, now we're going to switch metaphors -- but it's not like you're building a huge skyscraper and have to start from the beginning. You just have to find the trains.

MR. LISTERBEE: I would say again that this is research that we have supported from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention from the beginning. We believe that the findings -- the preliminary findings are very exciting for us, so we are really very supportive of it. The proposal itself does indicate that before the discussions about taking it to scale, really are going to get developed further. They're really going to have to finish the study itself. So that means finishing the current academic year, and finishing the next academic year. So we have really the results in, so we can make some definitive hard numbers and then have something to go forward with, so we're certainly in agreement there.
I think that one of the big challenges that has been point out is that we don't know the exact active ingredients that are really driving the success here. We know, for example, that the math program that focuses on math is pretty critical, but we don't really know for example exactly what drives or works with girls, and we know girls are one of the largest and fastest growing groups in the juvenile justice system. From my point of view, we don't know a lot about how trauma comes into play here, and we know that trauma's a really important element that derails the normal development of children. So you know, from the point of view of the research community that we support at OJJDP, we're looking to make sure that we have definitive results, so we can make strong recommendations to funders and Congress and other places, as to what they should be doing around this. We know also that there are a number of other programs that we have in other areas that we're doing a lot of research on, around violence prevention, the Defending Childhood Initiative that the Attorney General started.
several years ago. We're going a lot of research around that. The National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention in some of our major cities -- again, that is working. Looking at work in tribal areas -- we have some cultural sensitivity issues that we have to bring into play as we try and figure out what actually works in tribal areas and what actually works from a cultural point of view from a lot of our Hispanic communities. So we're looking to figure out how that works.

In addition, as I pointed out earlier, rural communities are a driving force here. We need to know, and I heard from the rural communities in my travels and in my work with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, that distances, learning procedures, resources and how kids actually get from point A to point B to get the services we're talking about, are scarce. And so as I'm thinking about taking this to scale nationally, I'm thinking about all these different issues, because we represent the entire country, and as I look at places like
Alaska or even in Guam, or out on the western part of the country, there are vast areas that are rural, and we need to be able to figure out how we bring that to scale in those kinds of areas. So those are the questions I'm asking myself. Those are the questions our researchers, and one of whom is present here in the audience here today, is asking us -- how do we do all this Bob, so we can make sure that we provide resources to our entire nation of children, who are desperately in need of these kinds of services.

MR. LUDWIG: Can I just add one piggyback on this, tying together that comment about girls with the thing that Larry said? So we organized a book on crime through the University of Chicago Press a few years ago. I was delighted to meet Liz when she told me she had a copy of the book. I said, you're half our readership, and then she said I have two copies. And that our entire readership was embodied in one person, so it's nice to have my readers on the panel. One of the chapters in there is by a demographer at Duke named Seth Sanders, and he generated a graph that
overlays the crime trend in the United States over the last 30 or 40 years, overlaid against that teen fertility rate. And when you put them on the same scale, what is absolutely striking is that you would think there is literally only one line on the graph. They are so tightly -- and I just wanted to underscore your point about the importance about thinking about girls in the conversation as well and Larry's point about the possibility -- if we can figure out how to do this sort of intervention and scale it and export it to different sort of settings, this really will have not just potentially ripple over effects to the different outcome domains for this generation, but if you can start to do things like change teen fertility patterns, you start to think very hopefully about potential intergenerational affects which would be even huger, which is really exciting.

   MR. LISTERBEE: I think that this has important funding implications too, because it shouldn't just be funded by the Department of Justice.

   MR. TANKERSLEY: Right.
MR. LISTERBEE: I mean this is the kind of intervention that ought to be shared with the national initiatives on drug abuse, with NICHD, with National Institute on Mental Health, with NIAAA. Because I think that many of different kinds of outcomes that we're interested in might be affected by this kind of broad based general intervention.

MR. LISTERBEE: I think the recommendation of the report is that the coordinating council of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention be the entity that should coordinate these efforts. It is chaired by the Attorney General of the United States, and it has several cabinet members who are already a part of it, including Health and Human Services, Department of Defense has a representative present, Agriculture, the Secretary of Education, and so on. So they're already at the table in the coordinating council. I thought that was a very good recommendation as well, and I think under the direction of the Attorney General, you have both the law enforcement component as well as people from...
education, so you can drive the direction of the initiative. So I think that's a good aspect of the proposal that I would also like to recommend we give further consideration to.

MR. TANKERSLEY: So for all that we in this room can talk and care about the gold plating of the study and the various issues of implementation, outside this room, politics really matter. And I want to start with Liz. Is this a program you can sell, politically?

MS. GLAZER: I would say yes. I mean, I hate to be the Pollyanna on the panel.

MR. TANKERSLEY: This is Washington, there are no Pollyanna's. It's fantastic. Optimism on a Thursday.

MS. GLAZER: I think it's hard to argue with success in an area where -- two areas at least -- where everyone is searching for solutions to very hard problems. And this is something where I -- to the extent that you're able to show the kinds of cost savings that I think Jens and Anuj's study lay out,
again, to take Bob's point, right at the end of the study, hopefully that will be even more borne out. But that's a pretty compelling argument to budget makers and to law makers. So I think it could have real legs.

MR. LISTERBEE: I agree for this reason. We are at a critical juncture in our nation in terms of reforming juvenile justice. We have a number of states and I'll indicate just a few -- Ohio, Connecticut, New York, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky -- that are looking at major reforms in their juvenile justice systems. They're looking for programs that work. And if this comes out at a time when it's clear that it is a program that's going to work, those states are positioned with the top officials in the government -- the governors and the legislators and the members of the judiciary, who are ready to reform their systems. Places like Connecticut have already done an awful lot of work in reforming their systems. They're reducing the number of children in detention. They're reducing the number of children in detention.
placement. The long term placement costs are like $88,000 a year on average, but in some places, like New York State, there's as large as $262,000 dollars per year per child for secure confinement before they began the reduction five years ago. They're down much lower now, and they've closed 24 of their 36 facilities. But these kinds of reforms are going on across our nation now. It's an ideal time to look at other kinds of things that are working, things that change the paradigm shift, things that have the support of the academic community, the psychological community in particular that Dr. Steinberg represents that have done so much work in this area, and helped us learn better about what really works with kids.

MR. STEINBERG: I'll just give you a very quick story that I think responds to your question. We're doing a study now in Philadelphia -- you think you have problems in Chicago -- we're doing a study in Philadelphia in which we're looking at the impact of diverting kids from the juvenile justice system, partly funded by OJJDP.
MR. LISTERBEE: Okay.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you. To look to see, what happens if we just keep them out of the system? These are first time juvenile offenders, and we're comparing those matched with the sample kids that get processed in the juvenile justice system. We don't know the outcome yet. But I was meeting with the chief of juvenile probation, to talk to him about working out some logistics in the study, and he said before we talk about this, we're hearing a lot about this program in Chicago called BAM, and it seems to be working and do you think we ought to be doing this in Philadelphia? So I think that as you say, if this works and can be scaled and word spreads about it, and it saves a lot of money, I think there will be lots of states and municipalities that will be interested in doing something like this.

MR. LUDWIG: The only think that I was going to very quickly add to this is I think it is important to acknowledge that the American public -- a large share of the American public has been deeply
skeptical, about the ability of social policy to substantially change behavior. Going back in the 1970s there was a very influential public interest article saying nothing works. I think one of the things -- and so there's a reason that policy makers have run the television cameras and announced get tough on crime initiatives. I think my hypothesis is, one of the reasons why the -- because this evidence has gained at least a little bit of traction in policy circles, is because it does come from a randomized trial, and so it has the credibility of that. That the city of Chicago has now started to help scale it up there and as Larry mentioned, some other cities have become interested. And I think that, and this is a point that Liz raised. I think that is not just an incidental detail that should only be of research interest here. I think that is also an important part of the policy conversation and how you think about moving this forward potentially.

MR. TANKERSLEY: I want to remind everyone that we're going to take questions from the audience.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180  Fax (703) 519-7190
here in just a moment, and so have them ready. But let's go back to the panel first, a second. I want to stick with the politics, because I think it's important. Two billion dollars is a lot of money in Washington today, and has budget constraints. So do you need to have an estimated cost savings over the life span of the program in order to sell it, and if so, how can you make a realistic estimate?

MR. LUDWIG: So one of the -- for the first five years of the intervention, we are proposing to test this in different cities to try to answer some of these very important questions about how you adapt it to different circumstances and so on. I think we are spending money right now on -- that's not a lot of money by federal government standards, that's 50 or 100 million dollars a year, and we're spending a lot of money on different things that would not have nearly the same sort of public safety benefits as this. So for instance we spend at least that much money on school security, trying to prevent the next mass shooting at a school. One percent of all kids 18
and under in the United States are murdered in schools every year. The big safety problem for young people in the United States is kids being shot out on the street in places like the south side and the west side of Chicago. And I think that sort of diversion, if the goal is to try and save as many young people's lives in the United States as possible, that sort of shift, at least to figure out whether this really works in different settings, seems to me like a no-brainer.

MR. LISTERBEE: Let me just add a factor that I think is important when looking at costs. I can't answer the political question. That's beyond the scope of my job and my ability really. But I think that we need to recognize that the overwhelming majority of the funds spent on juvenile justice are spent by the states and by local communities. It's been estimated by a member of our science advisory committee that 92 cents out of every dollar spent on juvenile justice is spent by the states. And so I think the persuasion part really does have to happen.
at the state level. We may be able to get the two billion, but it may cost a lot more out in the states, and then we're going to have to persuade the people in the states of the value of this work. And America is already in a real reform mode for juvenile justice. The country has recognized that the number of arrests have declined from 2.9 million in 1997 down to about 1.6 million in 2010. So the number of arrests in juvenile justice are down, crime is down, and America's looking to reform its systems because they're very costly, and because they're not getting the kind of outcomes that they want for our kids. And so I think we need to be aware that that has already improved juvenile justice. I'm not sure that we have to persuade a lot of folks. I think we just have to persuade folks of the value of this particular program and that it's cost effective. That's my view of it at least so far.

MR. STEINBERG: I think that we need to be cognizant of the fact that in many instances, the institution that's paying for the intervention is not
the institution that's going to recognize the savings. All right? So if we asked the Department of Education of a state to pay for implementing something in schools and the savings come down to the Department of Corrections, now we've got to persuade the Department of Corrections to give that money to the Department of Education. So this is going to take some, not only careful thinking, but it's going to take strong leadership at the top -- governors' offices, mayors' offices -- to say we're not going to allow these turf wars to get in the way of doing something that's going to be good for our kids.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right. So we've got some questions from the twitters, which is great. "In a time of unlimited government resources, for example, food stamps were just cut, should we be spending money, 'changing the way kids think', instead of meeting kids basic needs, like food and shelter"?

MR. LUDWIG: You know, the -- it seems to me like -- so, ideally we would live in a world in which there were not the trade-offs, and certainly it is the
case that the federal government and state and local
governments spend lots of money on things other than
programs to help disadvantaged kids and food stamps.
I think the -- it is critically important to make sure
that we are not underinvesting in things that are
going to make kids self-sufficient over the long term,
and so I think to the extent to which you thought you
got yourself in a place where you thought there was
some unavoidable trade-off between these two things,
ideally that would only be a short term situation,
because over the long term you would be improving the
ability of people to graduate from high school and
stay out of the criminal justice system and support
themselves.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Other thoughts on that?

All right. Next question. Would this program be
better provided by the private sector instead of by
cash strapped states?

MR. LUDWIG: I think it's useful to
distinguish between the funding of the program and the
delivery of the program. And the way that we've
tested this in the juvenile detention center, it was delivered by the public sector there. It was detention staff that were trained and delivered it but when we studied the youth guidance program on Becoming a Man, the youth guidance program providers go into the school, so it's been mostly funding up until recently by philanthropic support not state support. In principal, if you took this to scale, you could continue to use the same model, and one of the nice things about having a nonprofit provider come in the schools and deliver it -- it gets back to one of the things that I think Larry mentioned before, which is, the school's already being asked to do a lot, and urban public school systems are -- it's very hard to change what they're doing. And the nice thing about this is that all you are asking of the public school system is to just get out of the way just a little bit so the nonprofit can come in and have a couple rooms in the high school and do their thing.

MR. STEINBERG: You know there are some interesting experiments going on. The one that has
received the most attention recently is the Goldman Sachs New York City cooperative venture, where Goldman is putting up some money, investing in a juvenile justice reform as a genuine investment, and that they are going to get back their investment, hopefully plus more, by bringing down crime and cost savings that way. So I think there are new and interesting ways to think about involving the private sector in helping to finance some of these kinds of programs that have a payoff. We have a shortage of highly educated workers in this country. And these problems are all interconnected. I think that's one of the messages I'd like to drive home here. The same problems that contribute to youth crime contribute to the fact that we have unemployment in this demographic that's so high. So we need to think about investing in kids, and not just preventing crime. They're really the same thing.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Does anybody else want to take a stab at that one? All right, how much of the favorable results of the study is explained by the
Hawthorne effect and not by the programs themselves?

MR. LUDWIG: Yes, so for those of you who don't know what a Hawthorne effect is, there was a very famous study in Hawthorne whatever, I don't know what the state was --

SPEAKER: New Jersey.

MR. LUDWIG: New Jersey -- I'll assume that that's right. And it's some factory that they were producing whatever, and some researcher went in there and said, what happens if we increase the -- I think this is more or less approximately the spirit of the thing -- they say what happens to productivity if we increase the lights in the factory? And the productivity went up. And then they said, I wonder what happens if we make it darker? And productivity went up again. And I think the lesson for many people in the field has been that, just going in and studying something can change behavior. I think my -- I have a couple different reactions to that. One is that when you look at -- we've done Becoming a Man across a bunch of different schools, and the schools where the
kids go to Becoming a Man sessions more often, you see bigger behavior change, which doesn't seem consistent with the idea that it's just a generic Hawthorne effect. I think the other thing that I would say is, you know, go to the what works clearing house or a blueprints for violence prevention -- these are websites that summarize what we know about. Lots of people have done studies to try and change behavioral outcomes for disadvantaged teens, including disadvantaged male teens, and there's not a surplus of programs that have shown really big behavioral responses. And so, if we lived in a world in which kids were super responsive to having some nerd look over their shoulder, you'd expect to see a billion different studies showing behavioral responses, and that's not what you see, so I would be very surprised if that's what this was.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right, I'm going to take a -- I'm going to read you this question and then try to broaden it a bit so that the whole panel -- because I feel like we're having an intimate
conversation with me and Jens from across the panel here. The question is about the example you gave in the talk, about the boy in Chicago. The question is, why did he have a gun in his waistband. Where did he get the gun? Wouldn't stop and frisk reduce the number of guns and therefore reduce the amount of violence. So I guess I would broaden that question for everyone to say, how much of what we're talking about here in terms of changing behaviors -- how do you weigh that against proposals to try to reduce the amount of violent possibilities, whether that's by restricting weapons or by just keeping violent people off the streets?

MS. GLAZER: I don't think these are exclusive solutions, right? I mean I think that we're talking at a whole range of opportunities for intervention, by a whole range of people. And some of them are direct law enforcement responses that happen at certain stages. But I think the thing that is exciting here, is that we're recognizing that complex of issues of which crime is one expression, but there
are a lot of other pieces. And this is a way in. And it doesn't mean that you stop policing. It doesn't mean that you stop doing anything that works to reduce crime. But this is reducing crime plus, and it's doing it earlier, and it's doing it with a whole host of other folks.

MR. LUDWIG: And let me just add a little bit to this. I think there is a part of the question that absolutely seems right, which is that it's gun violence specifically that turns a lot of this automatic or impulsive, whatever you want to call it, adolescent behavior into a tragedy. We had a situation earlier this week where a 14 year old girl shoots another 14 year old girl on the south side over some facebook thing over a boy. It was a fist fight and then some relative apparently brought the gun to the scene, and now it's a homicide. So we have, at the University of Chicago Crime Lab, we've worked for years to develop a formula about this, where we say gun violence equals guns plus violence. And I think that speaks to -- that was also a joke. It speaks to
the idea that you can push on both sides of that and like Liz, I wouldn't view those things as mutually exclusive. The only other thing that I would add to this is, it's not to say that -- you are interested in trying to take the gun out of the kid's waistband during that event, is not to say that, for instance, stop and frisk is the only thing that you can do. There are a variety of things that you can do, you can try, on the regulatory side, trying to disrupt underground gun markets, down to trying to reduce illegal gun carrying. There's not just one thing on that side of the equation too.

MR. LISTERBEE: I would add that we know that over half of the murders in the country each year are young African American and Hispanic men. We know that that involves gun violence, so there's obviously and clearly a need for law enforcement participation there. We also know that if young people are in school and successful, they are much less likely to become involved in the juvenile justice or criminal justice system. We know that half of the kids who
drop out or rather about 70 percent of the young African American Hispanic boys who drop out of school are likely to be in the criminal justice system at one point or another before they're 32nd birthday. So we know that keeping them in school, having them successful, really is a prescription towards avoiding a lot of the violent behavior, and also the original research that was done with the first 100 boys showed that there was a 44 percent reduction in assaultive behavior, which doesn't necessarily mean guns, but it's the kind of things that lead to negative aggressive assaultive interactions that can lead to gun violence so I think that this is important, from that point of view. If we can reduce negative aggressive interactions between young boys early on, we're less likely to have a gun violence. Boys go, and girls go get guns when they run into a lot of different situations, that start off as fights in school. And so if we can reduce that, we're less likely to have the kind of homicide rates from these young kids that we see now.
MR. STEINBERG: There are a number of different ways to limit adolescents' access to hand guns that vary in their effectiveness, and this huge study was done, and published very recently, of New York stop and frisk data, and it shows it's a very ineffective way of getting guns off the street, because you have to stop so many people to recover just a small number of guns. So you end up then having lots of kids have contact with law authority, which isn't good for them, when they haven't done anything, when they haven't done anything wrong. So I agree with the questioner that getting guns out of kids' hands is an important part of a comprehensive program here, but I don't think that stop and frisk is a good way to accomplish that.

MR. LISTERBEE: And Larry, let me just add that what we know from research that you've done and others have done, is that if young people believe that the criminal justice and juvenile justice systems are fair --

MR. STEINBERG: Right.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190
MR. LISTERBEE: They're more likely to participate in it in a constructive way. So if they are arrested, if they are adjudicated delinquent, they are more likely to cooperate with their own rehabilitation. Also, a lot of young people are victims of crime. If they don't trust the police, they're not going to even report the crime. They won't report it, and if they report it, they're not going to become witnesses because they don't trust law enforcement. They don't trust our criminal justice establishment. They think they're going to get pulled into it and they may become victims either because they're witnesses and somebody decides to harm them, or because the system is just not going to protect their interests so, being fair -- young people understand fairness in ways that many of us forget as we get older. But young people truly understand that, and they want us to respond to them appropriately and accordingly.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right, more questions from the crowd. A simple one -- why are Latino
children included in this discussion?

MR. LUDWIG: Why are or are not?

MR. TANKERSLEY: Are.

MR. LUDWIG: Why are they?

MR. TANKERSLEY: Yes.

MR. LUDWIG: So if you look at the crime data and the vital statistics data in the United States, what you see is that there are absolutely enormous, heart breaking giant disparities in homicide victimization rates between African Americans and whites, not quite as big, but also very worrisomely large disparities between Hispanics and whites as well. So when we're in Chicago and doing these studies, if you look at the crime map in Chicago, what you see is that, unfortunately the violence is disproportionately concentrated in very poor African American neighborhoods but also in very poor Hispanic -- overwhelmingly Hispanic neighborhoods. And when we do these experiments, or these studies in Chicago to try and help kids, we are always working in a mix of different neighborhoods on.
the south and west side that includes Hispanic kids as well as African American kids.

MR. STEINBERG: If we were having this conversation in Los Angeles or Phoenix, no one would ask that question, right? I mean, so there clearly is disproportionate contact with the justice system among Latino youth compared to white youth.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right. A report by the FBI several years ago indicated that the number one predictor of criminal behavior is the absence of a father in the household. How do you factor this into your program model -- family structure?

MR. LUDWIG: So the Becoming a Man program -- one of the nice things that I like about it as a policy guy and someone who's thinking about how to take it to scale, is that the program providers have worked very hard to try and keep the costs down. And one of the ways that they keep the costs down is they work with the kids primarily in groups in the school setting, which makes it feasible to then think about giving this to lots of kids. I think the
becoming a man counselors try and do a little bit with the families but to do something really intensive with families starts to substantially change the cost. Now there have been other programs that have tried to work with families. I think that some of those have positive results. I think maybe the evidence there is not quite as rock solid or uniform as we would like. But there are some encouraging models that do work with families that do have some problems. I think one of the goals that we have for this line of research is to figure out at the end of the day which sort of strategy for which kids generates the most social good for dollars spent. Which kids should we be enrolling in Becoming a Man? Which kids would be better served with a more intensive intervention and expensive, that you'd want to do more with the family?

MR. LISTERBEE: I think it probably doesn't occur immediately to most people, but yes, single parenthood can contribute to an increase in crime. But being involved with the people in the justice system, particularly in incarceration, contributes to
single parenthood. So these are interconnected problems, right?

MR. LUDWIG: Yes, yes.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Well that's great. I think that I want to toss in a question from the economics report right here. We think a lot about incentives in economics, and the incentives can go to play on politics a lot. In this case, the incentives to improve outcomes among young men to make them less violent end up having less incarceration hopefully down the line. Well there are groups that have economic -- that economically benefit from incarceration, whether they're the folks who run prisons, or the prison guards unions, or what not. Do you factor those factors in when you think about pitching this program? How do you counterweight the other players in the economic sense of this transaction?

MR. LUDWIG: For me, one of the ways that I think about the importance of this sort of thing is,
order to survive over the long term and one is the school think and the other is the crime thing. And I think there is a lot of good evidence from the economics literature and other fields, showing that crime is one of the major reasons why people are leaving urban areas, independent of everything else that's going on. And so I think that cities understand this. I think if you think at the state level there might be more complicated tradeoffs but certainly at the city level, there are lots of mayors and city government people who are just relentless focused on trying to improve the public schools and control the crime problem to -- not just because it's good for everyone who's in their city, but because it's important for the city to remain a thing over the long time.

MR. LISTERBEE: I would only add on the issue of incentives, that we recognize in juvenile justice that because of the high cost of placement programs, as I mentioned earlier -- average costs, $88,000 a year for secured confinement. That if we
reduce the number of kids in those facilities, two out of three which are there not for violent behavior, that the states can save a lot of money. I think there's need to be incentives built into realigning the system, so that those savings can go to the right places, some of them in the juvenile justice system, some of them in other places, but certainly enough in the juvenile justice system to continue the realignment, continue the improvement and continue the changes that we're talking about, so that when positive programs come along like this, that there's funding available to fund some of these programs at the state level. So we need to build those incentives into all the new laws that we have, so we can do this proper realignment and continue to reduce our system in a thoughtful, constructive and positive way, with a little forethought. What's often happening is the savings are coming, and they're simply going back to the treasury and being redistributed across the system, without focusing on the juvenile justice system which caused a lot of the savings in the first
place.

MS. GLAZER: And I think to be fair, it's complicated.

MR. LISTERBEE: Yes.

MS. GLAZER: That the cities may not send people to prisons, but it's the states then that are running the prison system. So the incentives are not perfectly aligned in that way.

MR. LISTERBEE: Exactly.

MR. TANKERSLEY: Is this a more scalable idea, city to city, as opposed to in a federal program?

MS. GLAZER: Well it strikes me that you can do it a number of different ways. One is to say that federally we're going to do the whole thing at once, which has all kinds of appeal that I think was set out in the paper. I think that there is an enormous appeal locally bit by bit, which may avoid some of the issues, maybe sort of a more natural experiment to some of the issues that Bob was raising, which is, you know, the tribal areas, the rural areas, and the
cities each are going to have different needs and it will have to be tailored. And so one could imagine a sort of federation approach to this, in which individual entities, whatever it is, decide that this is the way to go.

MR. LISTERBEE: I just want to add, there are 56 different juvenile justice systems in our country. Each one is structured differently, and we have to think about how we scale up in 56 different areas, rather than a comprehensive national program, because you can try it in one state and one entity will be in control, on the other side with be corrections. In another state, it will be the Department of Public Welfare and they'll do it differently. Another it will be statewide, and another it will be in the major cities. So each state will do it differently. So we have to scale it up in a way to recognize those big differences.

MR. TANKERSLEY: All right, well I just want to thank you all for coming, and I especially want to thank our panelists. It was just a fantastic
discussion. Thanks everyone, thanks for hanging out with us this afternoon. It was great.

* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2016